A State of Reform?
The jailing of Russian oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky has revealed the fault lines running through the post-Soviet political economy. The reforms and privatization of the 1990s were so flawed and unfair as to make them unstable. A backlash was inevitable. Given Vladimir Putin's authoritarian tendencies, that backlash has proved equally flawed and unfair-and perhaps equally unstable.
To the Editor:
Marshall I. Goldman's "Putin and the Oligarchs" (November/December 2004) raises a number of useful points. It reduces the contemporary Russian business climate, however, to a clash between repentant oligarchs and greedy secret service agents, leaving out two important groups willing to work with the Kremlin to develop the Russian economy: the "patriotic" business class, comprising people such as Igor Naivalt, chairman of the board of the Baltic Construction Company; and a rising group of managers.
Goldman discusses the concerns of the siloviki-former KGB strongmen who are now government officials-in controlling Russia's natural resources, but does not mention Vladimir Litvinenko, rector of the State Mining Institute in St. Petersburg, who was an academic adviser to President Vladimir Putin and who continues to serve as a counselor to him. Litvinenko warned earlier this year that the government was "losing control" over the activities of natural resource companies. He has called for foreign investment in the resource-extraction sector to be limited to the processing segment and is opposed to non-Russian investors' taking majority control of mining enterprises.
Many of the trends Goldman identifies are policies Litvinenko has advocated; it is apparent that his positions influence not only Putin's thinking but also that of other key government officials, including Natural Resources Minister Yuri Trutnev, and even Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov.
Goldman talks about state control and ownership, but Putin and his advisers do not intend to recreate the old Soviet enterprises, top-heavy with management and burdened by inefficient central planning. Instead, they seem to want profitable companies that can generate a revenue stream for their shareholders-including the Russian state. What is emerging is state-directed capitalism, in which private owners play a role and have the opportunity to bank profits.
We are seeing in today's Russia the consolidation of a system of managed pluralism-in which the Kremlin sets the overall agenda, but with some room for political and economic competition and choice. Whether this is a disappointing direction depends on with whom you speak. Most Russians support Putin's vision of "orderly" state-directed reform, looking to the center to reel in the power of the oligarchs and local bosses.
There is indeed a pronounced authoritarian streak in today's Russia. But there are also optimistic signs-the seeds of a middle class beginning to take root, the steady rise in the number of home-grown charities and other civil-society organizations-that point to a more democratic Russia emerging in the future.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Executive Editor, The National Interest, and Senior Fellow, The Nixon Center
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Heretofore, Western observers of economic reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have concentrated almost exclusively on internal changes. Most of us have been fascinated by the provocative debate and by the subsequent decision of the East European governments to emphasize such concepts as profit, interest, rent and managerial autonomy and to deëmphasize centralized planning. This concentration on internal economic reforms has tended to divert attention from the equally significant changes that the East Europeans have introduced into their international economic structure.
The United States and the whole West are facing particularly hard times. Détente between the superpowers has come to a standstill; world peace is in jeopardy, and mistakes now can be more hazardous than ever before. The time has come to speak as candidly as possible, to avoid dangerous misunderstandings among Western partners and allies.
Russia's popular new president is better positioned than his predecessor was to enact needed reforms. But all of Vladimir Putin's efforts will come to nought unless he can do what Boris Yeltsin never did: rein in Russia's plutocrats. These ruthless oligarchs have fleeced Russia of staggering sums, seizing control of its oil industry -- one of the world's largest -- in the process. Through payoffs and intimidation, they have insinuated themselves into electoral politics and virtually immunized themselves from prosecution. None of Russia's problems -- neither its crippled economy, nor its emaciated infrastructure, nor its wheezing democracy -- will be solved while the robber barons retain their power. America cannot afford to sit on the sidelines any longer.
