The Next Nuclear Wave

Allison credits the Bush administration with rejecting "a status quo that left the terrorists and [weapons of mass destruction] threats to international law" and instead adopting a new, three-pronged strategy: going on the offensive against terrorists, openly confronting "axis of evil" states, and claiming a doctrine of pre-emption. But he indicts President George W. Bush's White House for neglecting "almost entirely the 'supply side'" of the nuclear terrorist threat--that posed by "loose nukes." The United States today spends no more on securing nuclear materials than it did before the attacks of September 11, 2001; the same amount of Russian nuclear material was secured in the two years after the attacks as was in the two years before. Allison reasonably asks why Bush did not include in his post-September 11 address to Congress a request to spend $10 billion in 100 days to secure the entirety of Russia's vulnerable nuclear complex (instead of later pledging to spend that amount over ten years). Money is not the only limiting factor, but such expenditure would at least indicate an appropriate sense of urgency.

Allison makes clear the important link between state arsenals and terrorist ambitions with his "three no's" to prevent nuclear catastrophe: no loose nukes, no new nascent nuclear states, no new nuclear weapons states. The first requires making all nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium, and plutonium as secure as the gold in Fort Knox (none of which has ever been stolen). The importance of this goal cannot be overstated: cutting off supply means no nuclear terrorism--period. The second goal is the most complex of the three, because it means fundamentally reconsidering the current system under which states can produce weapons-usable material for civilian purposes. The third demands a new line in the sand: under no circumstances will any non-nuclear state be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons. Allison knows these are ambitious objectives, but he makes a strong case for pursuing them.

THE NUCLEAR ICEBERG

The Nuclear Tipping Point will likely reach fewer members of the public, but one hopes that experts will take note of its insights about future nonproliferation challenges. Until recently, the global nonproliferation outlook seemed bright. In the past 20 years, more countries have abandoned nuclear programs than have started them or actually gone nuclear (with India and Pakistan as the main counterpoints to this trend). Only one nuclear state emerged when the Soviet Union dissolved: all but Russia voluntarily relinquished their nuclear capabilities. Countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Africa have given up nuclear weapons programs, and South Africa actually dismantled its six-weapon nuclear arsenal.

But as the book's first chapter, written by Reiss, lays out, "there is widespread concern that the calculus of [nuclear] incentives and disincentives has shifted during the past decade, with incentives increasing and disincentives declining." Indeed, the outlook for reversing North Korea's nuclear program is bleak, and Iran's long-term ambitions, a recent agreement notwithstanding, appear unchanged. This is not to suggest that a nuclear exchange is imminent, or that Tehran will launch a nuclear-tipped missile at Washington the moment it gains the ability to do so; deterrence is alive and well, despite some claims to the contrary. Still, the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea could very well cause these states' neighbors--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan--to reconsider their own nuclear options, sparking a dangerous wave of proliferation.

Thus, as the book's title implies, the world faces a nuclear tipping point. If the scale tips in one direction, a dozen countries could launch nuclear programs in the next few years. If it tips in the other, states will reaffirm that collective security depends on a shrinking number of states with nuclear capabilities and take strong steps to reinforce the global regime. The world is not, however, confronting one large nuclear iceberg, but dozens of smaller ones--each government with the means and motive to resort to the nuclear option must be approached individually and persuaded to remain non-nuclear.

The Nuclear Tipping Point includes eight case studies, each reviewing why a country decided not to go nuclear and what factors could lead its government to abandon abstinence in the near future. The cases--Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan--are geographically and politically diverse, presenting a variety of potential motives for reversal. The analysis goes beyond the knee-jerk predictions--"Egypt might turn radical and then go nuclear"--that often dominate security discussions.

The book describes the chosen states as "canaries in the coal mine": if their nonproliferation commitments die, then everyone will be at risk. To keep the canary singing, Campbell recommends that "the potential factors that could lead to a new round of proliferation among these countries should now be seen as a critical new component of American intelligence collection and analysis, preventative diplomacy, and U.S. decision-making on issues ranging from national strategy to public diplomacy." This task is in many ways more complex when it comes to U.S. allies, when nonproliferation concerns must be balanced with other U.S. policy priorities. Some officials are unconcerned about the potential of a close U.S. ally such as South Korea going nuclear. Yet this misguided view ignores the chains of proliferation that connect many potential nuclear states. With each new government that gets the bomb, curtailing proliferation becomes exponentially more difficult, to say nothing of the increased risk of theft or accidental use.