Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq
Throughout his distinguished career, Hoffmann has remained intellectually and personally bound to both America and France. In this engaging little book, he brings his accumulated wisdom and cosmopolitan sensibilities to bear on the current crisis in U.S.-European relations. The book, taking the form of an extended interview conducted by the French scholar Frédéric Bozo, is full of insights--and worries. They begin with a detailed discussion of the diplomatic missteps leading up to the Iraq war, then pull back and ponder the longer-term historical shifts that are unsettling transatlantic relations. Hoffmann's thesis is that today's transatlantic discord is different from past conflicts in the West--the crucial difference being the "philosophy" of the Bush administration regarding how to exercise power and treat disagreements among allies, and the lack of awareness in Europe of the depth of these shifts. Hoffmann notes that French leaders thought that their opposition to an Iraq war would be similar to their dissent on Vietnam, not realizing that Iraq was not seen in Washington as just another "out of area" adventure. His larger message is unmistakable: allies cannot be "treated as tins of polish for American boots" but must be partners in building a less unruly world.
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Seeks to transmute claims of US imperial decline into an agenda for its future role. Strategic doctrine should stress flexibility and the control of space, likened to control of the seas in times past. Areas of paramount geopolitical importance are (1) Eastern Europe and Germany (2) the Middle East (3) Central America, where a combination of anti-Yanqui nationalism and demography may even 'prompt a mood of panic' in the USA. The global role needs to be re-defined against parallels with other declining empires (Rome, Turkey) but also against lack of a successor -- "the Soviet Union will remain internally too weak to become a partner for peace and externally too strong to be satisfied with the status quo". Calls in particular for the upgrading to world status of the US-Japanese relationship -- 'Amerippon'. President Carter's security adviser, 1977-81. An excerpt was republished in 'Eastern Europe: a crisis in need of management' IHT 12 Apr 1988 p4.
In spite of a European swing to the right, "1987 saw relations between the governments of the United States and its European allies reach a nadir" for three reasons (1) the offhand US approach to disarmament evidenced at Reykjavik rekindled European fears about US reliability (2) Iran-Contra bungling, the administration's attitude to Third World problems and the 'Nietzschean approach' of US conservatives damaged USA morally in Europe -- in the worst case, Europe faces "a friendly and conciliatory Soviet Union and a cantankerous, bullying United States" (3) the budget deficit, which is likely to have the gravest long-term implications of the three, since "the true security of western Europe rests not on its military defences but on its economic and social stability".
The Clinton administration erred grievously in threatening intervention in the northern Balkans (Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia) and then quailing when it was needed. But in the southern Balkans (Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey), U.S. diplomacy has been successful, particularly compared with the clownish efforts of European nations. Capable U.S. envoys have worked hard to reverse the growing polarization of Greece and Turkey. Moreover, U.S. support has helped reinforce the fragile geographic firewall, Macedonia, thus preventing a wider regional war.

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