Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq
Throughout his distinguished career, Hoffmann has remained intellectually and personally bound to both America and France. In this engaging little book, he brings his accumulated wisdom and cosmopolitan sensibilities to bear on the current crisis in U.S.-European relations. The book, taking the form of an extended interview conducted by the French scholar Frédéric Bozo, is full of insights--and worries. They begin with a detailed discussion of the diplomatic missteps leading up to the Iraq war, then pull back and ponder the longer-term historical shifts that are unsettling transatlantic relations. Hoffmann's thesis is that today's transatlantic discord is different from past conflicts in the West--the crucial difference being the "philosophy" of the Bush administration regarding how to exercise power and treat disagreements among allies, and the lack of awareness in Europe of the depth of these shifts. Hoffmann notes that French leaders thought that their opposition to an Iraq war would be similar to their dissent on Vietnam, not realizing that Iraq was not seen in Washington as just another "out of area" adventure. His larger message is unmistakable: allies cannot be "treated as tins of polish for American boots" but must be partners in building a less unruly world.
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President Charles de Gaulle in discussing current Franco-American relations often focuses upon the prewar neutrality of the United States as well as upon his wartime differences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In doing so he conjures up the image of an unreliable American ally. His recollections have also pushed into the background of public memory the two years before France's tragic collapse in June 1940, when, in the words of former Premier Edouard Daladier, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend." As Premier during those years, Daladier witnessed at first hand the American President's efforts to help France order some 4,000 American combat planes to rebuild French defenses against the imminent attack of Hitler's vastly superior air power. Hitherto the details of the story have been wrapped in the secrecy of American and French archives, private papers and personal memories, but it can now be seen that Roosevelt concentrated his principal effort on that aid because he believed that in no other way could the United States strengthen France so significantly. Neither Morgenthau's monetary agreements nor the sale of machine tools and raw materials would do so much to increase French capacity to resist Nazi aggression. Roosevelt was ready to go as far as possible in spite of isolationist opposition to the delivery of planes to France because of his further conviction that, despite the Neutrality Act, the frontiers of the United States extended to the Rhine.
Antony Blinken has missed a fundamental transformation at work. America and Europe may still share values and interests, but Europe and the world have changed profoundly since the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship must change, too.
Over the full range of contemporary foreign affairs, American policy toward Western Europe has been marked by durability and rare continuity. The change of neither Presidents, Secretaries of State nor political parties has altered the lines of basic policy. The Government marches with American public opinion, for that ubiquitous man in the street still feels deeply that Western Europe is vital to the United States.
