The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s
Neither the popular explanation nor the oft-cited theory is right, Gagnon argues. The Balkan wars of the 1990s did not come about because of "ancient ethnic hatreds" or because ruthless elites manufactured crises to mobilize otherwise peacefully co-habiting communities to preserve their own power. Both Croatian and Serbian leaders manufactured crises all right, but it was in order to demobilize forces threatening the status quo with a move toward pluralism and liberalism. Violence, not ethnicity, was the tool, and it was consciously deployed not to exploit but to change popular identities, denying legitimacy to the reform-minded by rendering moribund the "political space" they sought to modify and substituting a harsh, fear-driven alternative. Gagnon challenges some widespread notions about the dangerous linkage between ethnicity and the upsurge of violence in the post-Cold War world, and he does it crisply and with plenty of carefully marshaled data.
Related
U.S. troops on conquered territory, infrastructure in ruins, international squabbling over reconstruction: a window onto occupied Germany seven months after V-E Day, when progress was still unsteady and Europe's future hung in the balance.
The crisis over Cuba and the Chinese invasion of India have had their salutary lessons for many nations and many political leaders-for none perhaps more than the neutralists. They have spoken up positively, as before, for peace and negotiation, against blocs and power politics. But what they have seen has attested to their relative inability to influence the course of events, or even to maintain solidarity in their own ranks, when the big powers are taking crucial decisions and the global strategic balance is at stake. A more pertinent question is whether, and how, the neutrals can safeguard their own vital interests.
Europe is increasingly restless with the division imposed on it more than twenty years ago. To end that division, and thereby to take a step toward a larger community of the developed nations, is a task requiring the often conflicting virtues of perseverance and imagination. It also requires asking explicitly: What can be done in the next twenty years to change this condition-and to change it in a way that is compatible with historical trends and more immediate requirements of political reality?
