Milosevic: A Biography
Slobodan Milosevic, although with worthy rivals among the culprits responsible for the misery that befell the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, stands sufficiently apart to draw biographers. Maybe it is his rise and fall--from the heights of power to the dock of an international criminal tribunal. Maybe his mix of ambition, skill, ruthlessness, and personality. Maybe the bond between him and the sorceress to whom he is married. Maybe the guilt the West feels, or writers think it should feel, for having done business with him. All of these impulses seem present in LeBor's case. He reported from the former Yugoslavia during the first stages of carnage and got caught up in the subject. He traces Milosevic's life from schoolboy to defense attorney (for himself in The Hague). What gives special vibrancy to the story, other than brisk, uncluttered prose, are the many interviews he conducted with schoolmates, early business associates, colleagues who served with him, colleagues destroyed by him, family members, and even Mirjana Markovic after her husband's arrest.
Related
In our nuclear age, questions of defense planning-once a fairly simple matter of estimating the amounts expended by the various nations, totting up numbers of mobilizable men, evaluating weapons (as in Janes Fighting Ships), appreciating the contributions of allies and so on-have passed into a surrealistic sphere of bluff, counterbluff, nightmare and potential extinction of the human race. Reassuringly, neither of the superpowers, even when one held a monopoly or a vast preponderance of nuclear power, has so far been willing to use, or to threaten the use of, the superweapon in pursuit of its political aims-even (as in Vietnam) against a tiny nonnuclear adversary. (Khrushchev's empty threat at the time of Suez was the exception that proves the rule.) Indeed, its possession has so far simply resulted in a perpetuation of the political status quo. Any negotiated arrangement between the superpowers on the limitation or even reduction of their nuclear panoply will also, most likely, only be possible on such a basis.
Charles Kupchan ("Independence for Kosovo," November/December 2005) is correct when he asserts that countries such as Russia have no real interest in Kosovo as a territory; Kosovo as a precedent, however, is another matter. Governments from Baku to Beijing and separatist regimes from Trans-Dniestria to the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus are taking a keen interest in how questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity are handled in the determination of Kosovo's final status.
Given the atrocities they have suffered in the past and the autonomy they are enjoying now, Kosovo's Albanians will never accept continued Serbian sovereignty. The time has come to give them what they want -- independence.
