Snowball Effect
In his first four years, George W. Bush presided over the most sweeping redesign of U.S. strategy since the days of F.D.R. Over the next four, his basic direction should remain the same: restoring security in a more dangerous world. Some midcourse corrections, however, are overdue. Washington should remember the art of speaking softly and the need for international legitimacy.
To the Editor:
John Lewis Gaddis makes an excellent point in "Grand Strategy in the Second Term" (January/February 2005) when he touches on the quandary over finding a balance between security and sovereignty that the world has found itself in as a result of the September 11, 2001, attacks. In the name of security, a state must now consider, as a matter of policy, breaching the sovereignty of other states if it is believed that they have the potential to undertake a strike. In addition, states are now more inclined, in the name of security, to develop weapons for protection against other countries that no longer recognize sovereignty as sacrosanct. Terrorism has changed the world, not only by instilling a sense of fear of future terrorist attacks, but also by forcing a conflict between policies that guarantee security and policies that recognize sovereignty.
This set of circumstances will ultimately and sadly form the impetus for nuclear proliferation, in turn presenting new and ever-worsening security challenges for the United States and the world. A similar cycle of weapons proliferation in the name of security played out in Europe in the years prior to World War I, with tragic results.
In addition to the threats posed by terrorist groups, the most pernicious security challenge in the post-September 11 world will thus arise from the potential use, both regionally and globally, of nuclear weapons. I hope I am wrong.
JIM WALLACE
Ridgefield, Connecticut
Related
The concepts emerging from the Bush administration's war on terrorism form a neoimperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, and using force. These radical ideas could transform today's world order in a way that the end of the Cold War did not. The administration's approach is fraught with peril and likely to fail. If history is any guide, it will trigger resistance that will leave America in a more hostile and divided world.
How will the United States defend itself against the unknown, the unseen, and the unexpected? One way is by exploiting new technologies to develop a flexible arsenal: reduced nuclear forces, advanced conventional capabilities, and a range of defenses against missile, space, and computer attacks. Yet all the high-tech weapons in the world will not defend the country unless the Pentagon and the armed forces change the way they train, fight, and think. Americans and their military must accept changing coalitions, understand the need for preemptive offense, and prepare for a new kind of war that may increasingly be waged with nonmilitary means. Now is precisely the time to begin making these changes; September 11 is all the proof we need.
In his first four years, George W. Bush presided over the most sweeping redesign of U.S. strategy since the days of F.D.R. Over the next four, his basic direction should remain the same: restoring security in a more dangerous world. Some midcourse corrections, however, are overdue. Washington should remember the art of speaking softly and the need for international legitimacy.
