Happy Thoughts
By losing the trust of the Iraqi people, the Bush administration has already lost the war. Moderate Iraqis can still win it, but only if they wean themselves from Washington and get support from elsewhere. To help them, the United States should reduce and ultimately eliminate its military presence, train Iraqis to beat the insurgency on their own, and rally Iran and European allies to the cause.
To the Editor:
In "Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War" (January/February 2005), James Dobbins writes that "the ongoing war in Iraq is not one that the United States can win." The evidence does not support this assertion. Dobbins also asserts that "[in] the eyes of the Iraqi people and of all the neighboring populations, the U.S. mission in Iraq lacks legitimacy and credibility." It is inaccurate to say that all of the neighboring populations hold this skepticism, although surely there are some to whom this ascription would apply. Dobbins further states, "Until Washington's democratization campaign can be purged of its association with pre-emption and occupation, it will have little resonance in the region." The Afghan elections in October 2004, President Hamid Karzai's laudatory comments about them, and the January 2005 Iraqi elections all contradict such an opinion.
Dobbins indulges in wishful thinking when calling for a special Iraqi envoy "to launch ... consultations [with] major U.S. allies, in particular the United Kingdom, France, and Germany." The same is true when he invokes the requirement of obtaining support from "the international community." Dobbins poses as alternatives what are complements when he proposes that "priority should be given to securing the civilian population, not hunting down insurgents." Lastly, he presents as new prescriptions what the United States is already attempting to do, namely, building "Iraqi forces under Iraqi leadership" and "training the Iraqi police."
CHARLES WOLF
Senior Economic Adviser and Corporate Fellow in International Economics, RAND Corporation
Related
Andrew Krepinevich ("How to Win in Iraq," September/October 2005) proposes Baghdad and Mosul as the two primary targets for "oil-spot offensives." He asserts that the focus should be on "protecting the population, not pursuing insurgent forces." This proposal ignores two basic realities. first, Baghdad and Mosul are sprawling cities. Their populations would be very difficult to protect without pulling troops, American or Iraqi, from more contentious parts of Iraq.
Public support for the war in Iraq has followed the same course as it did for the wars in Korea and Vietnam: broad enthusiasm at the outset with erosion of support as casualties mount. The experience of those past wars suggests that there is nothing President Bush can do to reverse this deterioration -- or to stave off an "Iraq syndrome" that could inhibit U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.
During Richard Nixon's first term, when I served as secretary of defense, we withdrew most U.S. forces from Vietnam while building up the South's ability to defend itself. The result was a success -- until Congress snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by cutting off funding for our ally in 1975. Washington should follow a similar strategy now, but this time finish the job properly.
