Happy Thoughts
By losing the trust of the Iraqi people, the Bush administration has already lost the war. Moderate Iraqis can still win it, but only if they wean themselves from Washington and get support from elsewhere. To help them, the United States should reduce and ultimately eliminate its military presence, train Iraqis to beat the insurgency on their own, and rally Iran and European allies to the cause.
To the Editor:
In "Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War" (January/February 2005), James Dobbins writes that "the ongoing war in Iraq is not one that the United States can win." The evidence does not support this assertion. Dobbins also asserts that "[in] the eyes of the Iraqi people and of all the neighboring populations, the U.S. mission in Iraq lacks legitimacy and credibility." It is inaccurate to say that all of the neighboring populations hold this skepticism, although surely there are some to whom this ascription would apply. Dobbins further states, "Until Washington's democratization campaign can be purged of its association with pre-emption and occupation, it will have little resonance in the region." The Afghan elections in October 2004, President Hamid Karzai's laudatory comments about them, and the January 2005 Iraqi elections all contradict such an opinion.
Dobbins indulges in wishful thinking when calling for a special Iraqi envoy "to launch ... consultations [with] major U.S. allies, in particular the United Kingdom, France, and Germany." The same is true when he invokes the requirement of obtaining support from "the international community." Dobbins poses as alternatives what are complements when he proposes that "priority should be given to securing the civilian population, not hunting down insurgents." Lastly, he presents as new prescriptions what the United States is already attempting to do, namely, building "Iraqi forces under Iraqi leadership" and "training the Iraqi police."
CHARLES WOLF
Senior Economic Adviser and Corporate Fellow in International Economics, RAND Corporation
Related
The White House still avoids the label, but by any reasonable historical standard, the Iraqi civil war has begun. The record of past such wars suggests that Washington cannot stop this one -- and that Iraqis will be able to reach a power-sharing deal only after much more fighting, if then. The United States can help bring about a settlement eventually by balancing Iraqi factions from afar, but there is little it can do to avert bloodshed now.
The best strategy for the United States now in Iraq is disengagement. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington might actually be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Why? Because geography ensures that all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself.
The current debate over the United States' failures in Iraq needs to go beyond bumper-sticker conclusions -- no more preemption, no more democracy promotion, no more nation building -- and acrimonious finger-pointing. Only by carefully considering where U.S. leaders, institutions, and policies have been at fault can valuable lessons be learned and future debacles avoided.

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