The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course
Coming at a time when terrorism and the troubled Iraqi adventure have forced foreign policy thinkers to reexamine their positions, this book is a helpful guide in the search for a new grand strategic synthesis. In his elegant case for a grand strategy of pragmatic internationalism, Haass argues that the United States should seize today's historic opportunity to build a cooperative order of great powers, organized around institutions and partnerships that focus on attacking specific problems: genocide, failed states, pandemic disease, climate change. The United States' unprecedented power and the current accord among major states make the present moment unique, in Haass' view, opening the way for a new Congress of Vienna, where great powers agree on the "rules of the road" and work together to keep the peace. But there is nothing inevitable about this peace -- the leading countries will need to compromise and exercise some strategic restraint to achieve it. Haass' disagreement with the Bush administration, accordingly, is not over the importance of maintaining U.S. primacy; it is over Bush's failure to use that primacy to integrate new states and lay down new global rules or to build a new global consensus on what the terms of sovereignty should be in a world where sovereignty can no longer be considered absolute.
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In today's interconnected world, weak and failed states pose an acute risk to U.S. and global security. Anticipating, averting, and responding to conflict requires more planning and better organization -- precisely the missions of the State Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.
Two postmortems on the Iraq occupation lambaste Washington for handling the job poorly. But doing much better would be so difficult that perhaps the bar should be raised for going to war in the first place.
IN the years since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has consisted primarily of the effort to cope with two immensely difficult problems which the events of that war brought into being, neither of which had been adequately anticipated and which the discussions among the victor powers at the end of the war failed to solve. One was the question of how should be filled the great political vacuums created by the removal of the hegemonies recently exercised by Germany and Japan over large and important areas of the Northern Hemisphere. The uncertainty and emerging disagreement over the attendant questions concerned not only much of Central and Eastern Europe but also parts of East Asia that had been overrun by the Japanese, including-alas-Indochina; and the settlement of the Asian aspects of the problem came to involve not only the United States and the Soviet Union and the inhabitants of the affected territories themselves but also, with the completion of the Chinese Revolution, the new communist power in China.
