Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order
In this impressive study, Legro argues that major strategic turning points are not simply the result of shifts in power and interests; they also involve the interplay of "collective ideas" within states about how to relate to the outside world. Legro explores many of the most important cases: the United States' turn to internationalism after World War II, Japan's decision in the 1860s to join the great powers, Germany's failed reintegration into Europe after World War I, Gorbachev's late-Soviet "new thinking." In each instance, shocks to old thinking -- typically war or economic calamity -- make possible a reorientation of foreign policy. And it is at these historical "pivot points," when the nation's interests are not clear and leaders are forced to puzzle about the future, that ideas and beliefs matter. The causal connections between power, interests, and collective ideas are not always clear, but Legro makes a compelling case that strategic beliefs cannot be reduced to strategic circumstance. He ends by reflecting on the future of the Bush "revolution" and argues that, absent further terrorist attacks, U.S. foreign policy is likely to tack back to the post-World War II mainstream.
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I Recently attended a round-table discussion of distinguished and imaginative Latin American leaders during which two speakers berated various countries for lack of "political will." In the first instance, what the United States needed to do to demonstrate its political will was to provide tariff preferences for imports of manufactured goods from less- developed countries. In the second case, political will was needed for Latin America to achieve an integrated, Hemisphere-wide, common market. To repeat: the speakers were men of substantial intellect.
Before complaining about China’s refusal to buy into the liberal world order, argues Amitai Etzioni, the West should stop moving the goalposts by developing new norms of intervention, such as “the responsibility to protect.” G. John Ikenberry responds that Beijing already has more than enough inducement to sign up.
Stop searching for order. The international structure established by the liberal democracies after World War II is still in place, and in many ways stronger than ever. Containment got most of the attention, but the liberal powers' agreement to manage trade, security, and other big matters cooperatively has been more durable, and more successful than most recognize. Besides, the order is deeply rooted in the American experience of democracy and constitutionalism. It shaped the Germany and Japan of today, and now most of the rest of the world wants to join.

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