Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War; Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership
These two collections of essays examine the rift between the United States and its European allies, caused by the new foreign policy of the Bush administration and the war in Iraq. The Levy, Pensky, and Torpey collection begins with the 2003 "manifesto" of Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida and gathers short pieces published in European newspapers (with the bizarre exception of French ones). The collection edited by Lindberg is a set of longer pieces, comments on or responses to Robert Kagan's famous essay on power and weakness -- on Martian (that is, martial) America and Venusian Europe.
Two or three years after these pieces were written, most do not seem as impressive as they may have when they first came out. On the European side, the clash between Washington and "old Europe" has not become a permanent cleavage, and the Europeans have spent far more time trying to rearrange their own house than denouncing their ally. The responses to Habermas and Derrida show a very broad range of reactions, misgivings, worries, and hesitations and convey a strong sense of collective impotence. The longer pieces in the Lindberg volume have the merit of showing that Kant was not as unrealistic as Kagan suggested and that the two sides of the Atlantic will continue to need each other. In the house of transatlantic relations, there was a genuinely damaging fire, but there was even more smoke and more coughing than actual burns.
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Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
At the end of 1964, a cycle of American-European argument which had opened some seven years earlier came to a close when President Johnson decided to abandon American pressure for an immediate resolution of the negotiations regarding a multilateral nuclear force. Since then the common assumption has been that there is to be a nine-month lull, until after the German elections in September, before the next phase of the dialogue on the future scope and nature of the Atlantic Alliance is resumed, even though any successful outcome to it may have to wait until the attitudes and policy of post-de Gaulle France are clear.
The differences that arise more or less regularly between the nations bordering the two sides of the North Atlantic are customarily laid to "misunderstandings." But the fact that these differences multiplied all through 1980 indicates that there exists between the United States and two of its principal European partners something of a crisis of confidence.

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