I Is for Infidel: From Holy War to Holy Terror; 18 Years Inside Afghanistan
Gannon, an Associated Press correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan from 1986 to 2005, depicts a political scene with no heroes. The mujahideen who took over after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan created such a woeful situation that the Taliban victory was to be expected and, yes, was well received at first. It was the mujahideen who first welcomed Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban's later ties with him just might have been aborted if there had been a better outside response to the "moderate" Taliban elements. Ahmed Shah Masoud, the closest candidate for hero in other accounts, is not much mentioned here, but Gannon sees the Northern Alliance he led until his assassination two days before September 11, 2001, as a bad lot, and poor fighters to boot. The previous ties that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistani intelligence had with the worst of the above suggest the fragility of now relying on Musharraf. The first post-Taliban president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, is a good man, but seemingly not strong enough. Gannon tells a compelling first-person story of politics during these years, relying on her contacts with the great and the small and her reporter's eye for the seemingly minor detail that illuminates much. Why the title? See page 141.
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Across one of the world's most sensitive regions, radical Islam and repressive politics are gaining ground. As they consolidate their power over Afghanistan, the Taliban are starting to destabilize the entire surrounding area -- and beyond. Muslim fundamentalists from around the globe study revolution under their tutelage, rebel armies find sanctuary on their turf, and the drugs and other goods that are smuggled out of the country are undermining the economies of Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors. The Great Game has changed, and the West must learn the new rules.
Asks whether the Reykjavik summit and Irangate have shaken the USA's self-confidence and standing in the world. Reykjavik threatened the credibility of the West's flexible response strategy, while Irangate undermined the authority of the President, made a nonsense of his anti-terrorism campaign, and embarrassed and angered his Middle Eastern allies. On the other hand, the USSR is no longer in a position to gain from these blunders.
The first engagement in the new war on terrorism -- with Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan -- poses severe challenges for the United States. Rooting out bin Ladin's network will require military success in a country that the Soviet Union could not conquer in ten years of trying, as well as support from unstable surrounding nations. Washington may be tempted to try to oust the Taliban regime, but doing so could rekindle Afghanistan's brutal civil war. The United States must proceed with caution -- or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history.
