The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: U.S.-European Relations After Iraq
Of all the volumes devoted to the U.S.-European crisis over Iraq, this one, the result of a series of seminars at the European University Institute in 2002, is probably the most balanced and probing. Most of the authors deal not only with the "blowup" of 2002-3 but also with earlier tensions and trends, adding depth to their treatment of the crisis itself. This is particularly true of the chapters by Geir Lundestad and David Andrews, and also of the superb contributions by Georges-Henri Soutou (on French policy) and William Wallace and Tim Oliver (on the United Kingdom). Miles Kahler adds a very convincing analysis of both continuities and recent changes (including the new ethnic politics and ideological polarization) on the U.S. side. The most elaborate and serious defense of the Bush administration's foreign policy, based on a long-term view of U.S. diplomacy, is made by Marc Trachtenberg, who saw Saddam Hussein as a far more serious threat than did most other analysts.
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Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
At the end of 1964, a cycle of American-European argument which had opened some seven years earlier came to a close when President Johnson decided to abandon American pressure for an immediate resolution of the negotiations regarding a multilateral nuclear force. Since then the common assumption has been that there is to be a nine-month lull, until after the German elections in September, before the next phase of the dialogue on the future scope and nature of the Atlantic Alliance is resumed, even though any successful outcome to it may have to wait until the attitudes and policy of post-de Gaulle France are clear.
The differences that arise more or less regularly between the nations bordering the two sides of the North Atlantic are customarily laid to "misunderstandings." But the fact that these differences multiplied all through 1980 indicates that there exists between the United States and two of its principal European partners something of a crisis of confidence.

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