The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: U.S.-European Relations After Iraq
Of all the volumes devoted to the U.S.-European crisis over Iraq, this one, the result of a series of seminars at the European University Institute in 2002, is probably the most balanced and probing. Most of the authors deal not only with the "blowup" of 2002-3 but also with earlier tensions and trends, adding depth to their treatment of the crisis itself. This is particularly true of the chapters by Geir Lundestad and David Andrews, and also of the superb contributions by Georges-Henri Soutou (on French policy) and William Wallace and Tim Oliver (on the United Kingdom). Miles Kahler adds a very convincing analysis of both continuities and recent changes (including the new ethnic politics and ideological polarization) on the U.S. side. The most elaborate and serious defense of the Bush administration's foreign policy, based on a long-term view of U.S. diplomacy, is made by Marc Trachtenberg, who saw Saddam Hussein as a far more serious threat than did most other analysts.
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Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
Antony Blinken has missed a fundamental transformation at work. America and Europe may still share values and interests, but Europe and the world have changed profoundly since the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship must change, too.
President Charles de Gaulle in discussing current Franco-American relations often focuses upon the prewar neutrality of the United States as well as upon his wartime differences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In doing so he conjures up the image of an unreliable American ally. His recollections have also pushed into the background of public memory the two years before France's tragic collapse in June 1940, when, in the words of former Premier Edouard Daladier, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend." As Premier during those years, Daladier witnessed at first hand the American President's efforts to help France order some 4,000 American combat planes to rebuild French defenses against the imminent attack of Hitler's vastly superior air power. Hitherto the details of the story have been wrapped in the secrecy of American and French archives, private papers and personal memories, but it can now be seen that Roosevelt concentrated his principal effort on that aid because he believed that in no other way could the United States strengthen France so significantly. Neither Morgenthau's monetary agreements nor the sale of machine tools and raw materials would do so much to increase French capacity to resist Nazi aggression. Roosevelt was ready to go as far as possible in spite of isolationist opposition to the delivery of planes to France because of his further conviction that, despite the Neutrality Act, the frontiers of the United States extended to the Rhine.
