Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War
Mission Italy tells in great detail the story of the four years of Gardner's service as ambassador to Rome during the Carter administration. It provides vignettes of "the almost Machiavellian Italian political context," many of which point to the considerable role played by the U.S. embassy in Italian political life during the Cold War. U.S. policy at the time was driven by one imperative: Italy, a crucial member of NATO, could not let the Communist Party enter into the government until it had disavowed its anti-American positions. Gardner describes the warnings he delivered, the Washington policy texts he helped draft, tensions with the State Department's less rigid line, and the times he read the riot act to Italian leaders. He succeeded in keeping the Italian Communists out of power, thanks largely to the revulsion caused by the Red Brigades' terrorism and to the divisions between social democrats and hard-line Leninists within the Communist Party itself. Still, Gardner considers the decision by the Italian government to accept theater nuclear forces for NATO in 1979 "a major factor in the unraveling of Communism and the ending of the Cold War." Italy's political system accounts for the incredible influence of the U.S. embassy; a similar attempt at using a form of power that was not really very soft would have been inconceivable not only in Paris or London but also in Bonn.
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Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
Antony Blinken has missed a fundamental transformation at work. America and Europe may still share values and interests, but Europe and the world have changed profoundly since the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship must change, too.
President Charles de Gaulle in discussing current Franco-American relations often focuses upon the prewar neutrality of the United States as well as upon his wartime differences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In doing so he conjures up the image of an unreliable American ally. His recollections have also pushed into the background of public memory the two years before France's tragic collapse in June 1940, when, in the words of former Premier Edouard Daladier, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend." As Premier during those years, Daladier witnessed at first hand the American President's efforts to help France order some 4,000 American combat planes to rebuild French defenses against the imminent attack of Hitler's vastly superior air power. Hitherto the details of the story have been wrapped in the secrecy of American and French archives, private papers and personal memories, but it can now be seen that Roosevelt concentrated his principal effort on that aid because he believed that in no other way could the United States strengthen France so significantly. Neither Morgenthau's monetary agreements nor the sale of machine tools and raw materials would do so much to increase French capacity to resist Nazi aggression. Roosevelt was ready to go as far as possible in spite of isolationist opposition to the delivery of planes to France because of his further conviction that, despite the Neutrality Act, the frontiers of the United States extended to the Rhine.
