Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War
Mission Italy tells in great detail the story of the four years of Gardner's service as ambassador to Rome during the Carter administration. It provides vignettes of "the almost Machiavellian Italian political context," many of which point to the considerable role played by the U.S. embassy in Italian political life during the Cold War. U.S. policy at the time was driven by one imperative: Italy, a crucial member of NATO, could not let the Communist Party enter into the government until it had disavowed its anti-American positions. Gardner describes the warnings he delivered, the Washington policy texts he helped draft, tensions with the State Department's less rigid line, and the times he read the riot act to Italian leaders. He succeeded in keeping the Italian Communists out of power, thanks largely to the revulsion caused by the Red Brigades' terrorism and to the divisions between social democrats and hard-line Leninists within the Communist Party itself. Still, Gardner considers the decision by the Italian government to accept theater nuclear forces for NATO in 1979 "a major factor in the unraveling of Communism and the ending of the Cold War." Italy's political system accounts for the incredible influence of the U.S. embassy; a similar attempt at using a form of power that was not really very soft would have been inconceivable not only in Paris or London but also in Bonn.
Related
Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
At the end of 1964, a cycle of American-European argument which had opened some seven years earlier came to a close when President Johnson decided to abandon American pressure for an immediate resolution of the negotiations regarding a multilateral nuclear force. Since then the common assumption has been that there is to be a nine-month lull, until after the German elections in September, before the next phase of the dialogue on the future scope and nature of the Atlantic Alliance is resumed, even though any successful outcome to it may have to wait until the attitudes and policy of post-de Gaulle France are clear.
The differences that arise more or less regularly between the nations bordering the two sides of the North Atlantic are customarily laid to "misunderstandings." But the fact that these differences multiplied all through 1980 indicates that there exists between the United States and two of its principal European partners something of a crisis of confidence.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.