Grading the War on Terrorism

Asking the Right Questions

With the end of the Bush administration coming into view and the threat of terrorism still pressing, there is a real need for a comprehensive reassessment of the U.S.-led "war on terror." The next administration will need a firm grasp of the nature of the challenge, a precise understanding of its predecessor's strategy, and a realistic plan for achieving better results.

Fundamental questions remain. In what sense, for example, do the events since the attacks of September 11, 2001, constitute a "war"? Who or what is the enemy? How can one judge success or failure? How serious are the threats to and the vulnerabilities of the U.S. homeland, and what should be done to address them? And how should the competing claims of foreign and domestic policies, economic and security interests, and American and foreign sensibilities be reconciled?

There is much to learn from the Bush administration's record. The administration itself, of course, rarely admits doubt or mistakes. The White House briefing room is not a Catholic church: there is precious little to gain from confession. The pressures of American politics and governance dissuade serving officials from speaking candidly, and so the burden of sustaining serious public debate falls to journalists, pundits, and outside experts.

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have written a good book about the contemporary terrorist threat and the U.S. government's efforts to deal with it. That text, The Age of Sacred Terror, was published in 2002. It drew effectively on the authors' experience as National Security Council staff members under President Bill Clinton and provided genuine insight into al Qaeda, Islamist radicalism, and the bureaucratic politics of counterterrorism during the Clinton administration. The book was widely -- and rightly -- praised.

Now, Benjamin and Simon have written another book on the same general subject, updating the story through the Bush years. This effort is a disappointment, less a work of scholarship than a polemic.

A BALANCE SHEET

Benjamin and Simon's thesis in The Next Attack is that "we are losing" the war on terrorism because of the ignorance, ineptitude, and ideological blinkers of the Bush administration. The authors believe that the unilateralism, provocative rhetoric, and overly aggressive tactics of the Bush team, and most of all the invasion and occupation of Iraq, have fanned the flames of Islamist radicalism around the world and are creating legions of new terrorist enemies. Their argument generally tracks that first put forward by the authors' former boss, Richard Clarke, in his 2004 book, Against All Enemies. The target audience seems to be readers who already agree with their conclusions. The book contains little new research about or analysis of what has happened or what should be done next.

Certainly, there is plenty to criticize in the Bush administration's prosecution of the war on terrorism. Osama bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, slipped away in the winter of 2001-2 and are still at large. Al Qaeda has metastasized from a well-funded, hierarchical organization based within a limited geographic sanctuary into a diffuse global movement and propaganda machine that inspires terrorists of all stripes. Several of the premises for the invasion of Iraq turned out to be false or misleading, and the U.S.-led coalition was unprepared for the massive postwar challenges of occupation, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, and political transformation. Anti-Americanism and radical militancy in the Muslim world seem to have intensified in part because of events in Iraq. The handling of detainees continues to be a grave problem for the United States. President George W. Bush and some of his aides have at times overreached with their rhetoric, such as with calls to "bring it on" or loose talk of "ending states." Meanwhile, many serious vulnerabilities in the homeland have gone unaddressed; Hurricane Katrina revealed the continuing limitations of federal, state, and local emergency-management capabilities.

Still, if the list of shortcomings is long, so is the list of achievements. A significant portion of the pre-9/11 al Qaeda leadership has been killed or captured. The Taliban has been deposed, a profound political transition is now under way in Afghanistan, and leadership of this effort is being progressively handed off to NATO. Saddam Hussein is behind bars, and, despite long odds, a legitimate constitutional and electoral process is under way in Iraq. Saudi Arabia largely routed a dangerous al Qaeda network on its soil through aggressive counterterrorist operations conducted with U.S. assistance after May 2003. The Pakistani security services have demonstrated the ability and willingness to take down al Qaeda operatives in urban settings.