Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War
These days it is almost historical revisionism to suggest that the Western democracies actually won World War I; so great was the carnage and so lasting the scars that the war has become a byword for nihilistic futility. Doughty's masterly, starkly titled account, although not denying the victory, reinforces the sense that any gains were outweighed by monumental loss. (France, with over 1.4 million dead and its countryside devastated, suffered as much as any country.) Yet it also conveys the French determination to win and describes the strategic judgments made by politicians and those in higher command that kept French forces going -- despite the disastrous offensives of Generals Joseph Joffre and Robert-Georges Nivelle, in 1915 and 1917, respectively. As the war drew to its close, it was unclear which side would collapse from exhaustion first. Doughty confirms that it was only the British and the Americans who kept the French staggering forward. Pyrrhic it might have been, but it still felt like a victory to the French -- unlike 1940, which, despite far fewer casualties, was a defeat.
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In our nuclear age, questions of defense planning-once a fairly simple matter of estimating the amounts expended by the various nations, totting up numbers of mobilizable men, evaluating weapons (as in Janes Fighting Ships), appreciating the contributions of allies and so on-have passed into a surrealistic sphere of bluff, counterbluff, nightmare and potential extinction of the human race. Reassuringly, neither of the superpowers, even when one held a monopoly or a vast preponderance of nuclear power, has so far been willing to use, or to threaten the use of, the superweapon in pursuit of its political aims-even (as in Vietnam) against a tiny nonnuclear adversary. (Khrushchev's empty threat at the time of Suez was the exception that proves the rule.) Indeed, its possession has so far simply resulted in a perpetuation of the political status quo. Any negotiated arrangement between the superpowers on the limitation or even reduction of their nuclear panoply will also, most likely, only be possible on such a basis.
Charles Kupchan ("Independence for Kosovo," November/December 2005) is correct when he asserts that countries such as Russia have no real interest in Kosovo as a territory; Kosovo as a precedent, however, is another matter. Governments from Baku to Beijing and separatist regimes from Trans-Dniestria to the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus are taking a keen interest in how questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity are handled in the determination of Kosovo's final status.
Given the atrocities they have suffered in the past and the autonomy they are enjoying now, Kosovo's Albanians will never accept continued Serbian sovereignty. The time has come to give them what they want -- independence.
