Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War
These days it is almost historical revisionism to suggest that the Western democracies actually won World War I; so great was the carnage and so lasting the scars that the war has become a byword for nihilistic futility. Doughty's masterly, starkly titled account, although not denying the victory, reinforces the sense that any gains were outweighed by monumental loss. (France, with over 1.4 million dead and its countryside devastated, suffered as much as any country.) Yet it also conveys the French determination to win and describes the strategic judgments made by politicians and those in higher command that kept French forces going -- despite the disastrous offensives of Generals Joseph Joffre and Robert-Georges Nivelle, in 1915 and 1917, respectively. As the war drew to its close, it was unclear which side would collapse from exhaustion first. Doughty confirms that it was only the British and the Americans who kept the French staggering forward. Pyrrhic it might have been, but it still felt like a victory to the French -- unlike 1940, which, despite far fewer casualties, was a defeat.
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Astonishing events in Czechoslovakia were only the latest in a series of changes in the communist world that took the outside world by surprise. The thaw and Hungarian rebellion of 1956, China's break with the Soviet Union and immersion in internal convulsion, and even the rejection of Russian control in Rumania-all were largely unforeseen (with only a few exceptions) even by expert opinion in the West, Like military planners who prepare for the last war, commentators on communist affairs in their preoccupation with accounting for the last surprise have often left the public unprepared for the next one. The concept of monolithic totalitarianism, based on parallels between Hitler and the later Stalin, ill prepared us to expect rebellion in Hungary; preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet split (which was only belatedly thought to be important, and then rapidly promoted into being the controlling factor in the divided communist world of the sixties) distracted us from any expectation of liberal deviation in Czechoslovakia.
Europe is increasingly restless with the division imposed on it more than twenty years ago. To end that division, and thereby to take a step toward a larger community of the developed nations, is a task requiring the often conflicting virtues of perseverance and imagination. It also requires asking explicitly: What can be done in the next twenty years to change this condition-and to change it in a way that is compatible with historical trends and more immediate requirements of political reality?
Europeans enter the 1980s experiencing, for the first time since the cold war, a deep sense of concern--and even fear in some quarters--for the preservation of peace on their Continent. The decade began with speeches by European leaders, including President Giscard d'Estaing and Pope John Paul II, stressing the risks of a new world war, and polls conducted in several European countries throughout 1980 echoed similar qualms.

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