Space Race: The Epic Battle Between America and the Soviet Union for Dominion of Space
From the opening account of Washington and Moscow's race to grab the models, machines, drawings, and personnel from Hitler's V-2 missile program at the end of World War II to Sputnik and then to Neil Armstrong's moonwalk, this is an utterly engrossing book -- largely because of the two characters around whom the story unfolds, and because Cadbury has the material to tell it from the inside. Wernher von Braun, the whiz in Hitler's rocket program who managed to reach American lines in a series of adventures worthy of a John le Carré novel, was on one side. Sergei Korolyov, who only by a series of miracles survived the Kolyma gold mines, the worst of Stalin's gulag, led the Soviet countereffort. To an eerie extent, the battles they fought and the timing of the key turning points for each were often parallel. This was true until nearly the end, when, after a lifetime of anonymity, Korolyov died a near icon, and von Braun died under a cloud -- not only because of his earlier rank as an SS officer, but also because of his ambiguous role in Mittelwerk, the unspeakable hell where the V-2 was mass-produced.
Related
Although Russia has projected itself more forcefully on the world stage since the beginning of the Putin era, its foreign policy still lacks any sort of grand strategic vision. Russian leaders continue to squabble over issues from NATO expansion to the world economy. But they are particularly concerned about Russia's identity, especially with regard to the post-Soviet states. If the Bush administration fails to devise a coherent policy of its own toward its former rival, it may face serious problems down the road.
The USA and USSR share an interest in stability, in the survival of Gorbachev and his initiatives, and in the adoption of a gradual, multilateral approach to German re-unification. The US choice is between (1) using the CFE negotiating structure to "perpetuate and legitimize an Eastern alliance that is imploding" (2) forgoing any follow-up to CFE by letting events take their course. The former course is preferable, providing a security framework through which change in Europe can be managed.
American presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, of course, was confronted by the tensions of Korea and President Kennedy by the Berlin crisis. Lyndon Johnson was a temporary exception, but Richard Nixon inherited Vietnam and the Czech crisis. Gerald Ford had to deal with a faltering détente, and Jimmy Carter was embroiled in early disputes. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan found himself in much the same position as his predecessors, except that relations were worse than usual. Indeed, relations were frozen. Even the outgoing Administration was pessimistic. The departing American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Thomas J. Watson, Jr., summed up the prevailing gloom: "I don't think the West has any conception of how dismal the future looks for East-West relations."

.jpg)
Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.