Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe vs. Liberal America
Pontusson, a distinguished political economist now at Princeton University, has done a very fine job of comparing the performances of the liberal market economies (in Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the social market economies (in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Benelux countries, and the Nordic countries). With a wealth of statistics, he reaches conclusions that undermine many of the oversimplifications that have long encumbered debate. Pontusson shows that the social market model can mitigate the tradeoff between equality and efficiency. Several social market economies have had lower unemployment rates than the average for the liberal market economies, although job creation has been higher in the latter. The postwar welfare state has also, through cash payments and the provision of services, reduced relative and absolute poverty, and there is no evidence that it has undercut economic growth or lowered living standards. Pontusson recommends that European socialists and progressives consider liberalizing measures on employment protection, as long as such measures are accompanied by higher public income support for the unemployed and steps to improve their employability. Market liberals, he concludes, should not be allowed to "define the terms of the economic and social policy debate."
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Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
Antony Blinken has missed a fundamental transformation at work. America and Europe may still share values and interests, but Europe and the world have changed profoundly since the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship must change, too.
President Charles de Gaulle in discussing current Franco-American relations often focuses upon the prewar neutrality of the United States as well as upon his wartime differences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In doing so he conjures up the image of an unreliable American ally. His recollections have also pushed into the background of public memory the two years before France's tragic collapse in June 1940, when, in the words of former Premier Edouard Daladier, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend." As Premier during those years, Daladier witnessed at first hand the American President's efforts to help France order some 4,000 American combat planes to rebuild French defenses against the imminent attack of Hitler's vastly superior air power. Hitherto the details of the story have been wrapped in the secrecy of American and French archives, private papers and personal memories, but it can now be seen that Roosevelt concentrated his principal effort on that aid because he believed that in no other way could the United States strengthen France so significantly. Neither Morgenthau's monetary agreements nor the sale of machine tools and raw materials would do so much to increase French capacity to resist Nazi aggression. Roosevelt was ready to go as far as possible in spite of isolationist opposition to the delivery of planes to France because of his further conviction that, despite the Neutrality Act, the frontiers of the United States extended to the Rhine.
