"The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy"
Seldom have just over 40 pages of text (plus just under 40 pages of notes) kicked up such a storm. Attacked for everything from being "sloppy scholarship" to anti-Semitic, this article is clearly neither. It is an argument advanced by two scholars, both of the realist school of international relations, that "unwavering U.S. support for Israel" is not in the United States' national interest. The damaging misfit between pro-Israel U.S. policies and U.S. interests in the Middle East, they argue, is the fault of a number of domestic pressure groups -- which they lump together as "the Israel Lobby" -- spearheaded by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Mearsheimer and Walt use realist national-interest analysis to deftly deconstruct the usual justifications for supporting Israel (that it is a fellow democracy, a strategic asset, or a tiny state in danger of being overwhelmed by its neighbors). They set out the role of that "Israel Lobby" in pushing for war against Iraq, and perhaps against other Middle Eastern regimes down the road.
May the storm kicked up by this article rage on. The role of pressure groups and lobbies in determining U.S. foreign policy is important. The U.S.-Israeli connection is important. The hardheaded analysis that Mearsheimer and Walt so cogently present cries out for careful consideration. It just might set in motion a useful paradigm shift in the United States' Middle East policy.
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The Foreigner's Gift is vintage Fouad Ajami: bold, crisp, wide-ranging, and discursive, it will surely both inform and provoke. But can the U.S. invasion of Iraq really be defended as a noble mission regardless of its cause -- or its outcome?
We face many foreign policy decisions--how to respond to the fighting in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Salvador, Angola, Kampuchea, the Philippines and soon, perhaps, South Africa--that involve the legality of intervening in a civil war. The international law journals are full of scholarly discussions on this subject. They are hard for non-scholars to follow. They disagree sharply, as scholars are wont to do, in their argumentation and conclusions. For readers who are not scholars of international law, this article tries to explain how the rules have evolved, where they now stand, and how they might be clarified to relieve the rising tension between the principle of nonintervention and the human rights of self-determination and open democratic elections.
Once again events in the Middle East and adjacent areas dominated the world situation in 1980. To Americans, the inability to obtain the release of the 52 diplomats held hostage in Tehran since November 1979 was particularly dismaying. But of even greater underlying importance was the inability to mount a firm allied or regional response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, where a grinding and brutal war went on with no sign of ending. In the fall, military conflict broke out between Iraq and Iran, again with no end in sight and with consequences for oil supply that by the end of the year had further tightened market prospects, and caused a new jump in oil prices. Finally, the Camp David process--which the Carter Administration had regarded as its greatest achievement--bogged down over issues of autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza that lay at the core of any hope for settlement of the issues between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
