Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them
In this provocative book, the noted political scientist Mueller argues that reactions to terrorism are a greater threat than terrorism itself. The scope and destructiveness of international terrorism, he contends, are limited; it is the inflation of this threat and the policy overreactions to it that impose severe costs on society. Mueller is correct to note that very few people have died in terrorist attacks, especially compared with other causes of death, such as car accidents, but the real fear of terrorism is prospective: it is focused on the possibility that an extremist network will detonate a nuclear device in a major city. Mueller acknowledges such a possibility but, taking issue with Harvard's Graham Allison and other experts, finds the obstacles to such a terrorist act formidable. In surveying encounters with past foreign threats (Pearl Harbor, Soviet communism), he sees a pattern of exaggeration, posturing, and -- after 9/11 -- a "terrorism industry" that has a vested interest in alarmism. This book will provoke a lively debate -- and to the extent it encourages an honest discussion of risk, this is to be welcomed. Moreover, Mueller's recommendations are ultimately quite sensible: since overreacting to groups such as al Qaeda plays into their hands, a long-term response to terrorism should entail patient and methodical intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security.
Related
The concepts emerging from the Bush administration's war on terrorism form a neoimperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, and using force. These radical ideas could transform today's world order in a way that the end of the Cold War did not. The administration's approach is fraught with peril and likely to fail. If history is any guide, it will trigger resistance that will leave America in a more hostile and divided world.
This article appears in the Foreign Affairs eBook, "The U.S. vs. al Qaeda: A History of the War on Terror." Now available for purchase.
The Bush administration has shrugged off the Syrian president's recent attempts at rapprochement with the West. It should think again. With Syria's old ally Saddam Hussein gone, Damascus is trapped in a strategic quandary that makes it highly receptive to coercive diplomacy--of the kind that worked on Libya. And by engaging Syria sooner rather than later, the United States could give the Middle East peace process a shove in the right direction.
By stressing unilateralism over cooperation, preemption over prevention, and firepower over staying power, the Bush administration has alienated the United States' natural allies and disengaged from many of the world's most pressing problems. To restore U.S. global standing--which is essential in checking the spread of lethal weapons and winning the war on terrorism--the next Democratic president must recognize the obvious: that means are as important as ends.

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