Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States
This volume affirms the widely shared view that global security now hinges on the ability of the international community to strengthen weak and failing states. Exploring the causes and consequences of state weakness in the developing world, these experts focus on "poorly performing states" -- those that exhibit the bleakest features of poverty and deficient government and are thus most prone to collapse. They argue that these troubled states all too easily become sites for illicit transnational networks and regionally destabilizing violence but are largely neglected by U.S. aid programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Account, which direct funds to "best performers." Corruption and state-sponsored predation are inevitably part of the story of state failure, but, the authors argue, the international community has also played a role in "supporting, emboldening, and replicating" ineffective government in weak and failing states. In a useful chapter, Carol Lancaster presents a set of principles to guide U.S. foreign assistance, emphasizing a case-by-case approach and utilization of the full array of carrots and sticks. But altogether, the authors underscore what is already known: the leverage of the outside aid community is limited and, without the presence of reform-minded elites, almost nonexistent.
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In today's interconnected world, weak and failed states pose an acute risk to U.S. and global security. Anticipating, averting, and responding to conflict requires more planning and better organization -- precisely the missions of the State Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.
Two postmortems on the Iraq occupation lambaste Washington for handling the job poorly. But doing much better would be so difficult that perhaps the bar should be raised for going to war in the first place.
IN the years since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has consisted primarily of the effort to cope with two immensely difficult problems which the events of that war brought into being, neither of which had been adequately anticipated and which the discussions among the victor powers at the end of the war failed to solve. One was the question of how should be filled the great political vacuums created by the removal of the hegemonies recently exercised by Germany and Japan over large and important areas of the Northern Hemisphere. The uncertainty and emerging disagreement over the attendant questions concerned not only much of Central and Eastern Europe but also parts of East Asia that had been overrun by the Japanese, including-alas-Indochina; and the settlement of the Asian aspects of the problem came to involve not only the United States and the Soviet Union and the inhabitants of the affected territories themselves but also, with the completion of the Chinese Revolution, the new communist power in China.
