Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States
This volume affirms the widely shared view that global security now hinges on the ability of the international community to strengthen weak and failing states. Exploring the causes and consequences of state weakness in the developing world, these experts focus on "poorly performing states" -- those that exhibit the bleakest features of poverty and deficient government and are thus most prone to collapse. They argue that these troubled states all too easily become sites for illicit transnational networks and regionally destabilizing violence but are largely neglected by U.S. aid programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Account, which direct funds to "best performers." Corruption and state-sponsored predation are inevitably part of the story of state failure, but, the authors argue, the international community has also played a role in "supporting, emboldening, and replicating" ineffective government in weak and failing states. In a useful chapter, Carol Lancaster presents a set of principles to guide U.S. foreign assistance, emphasizing a case-by-case approach and utilization of the full array of carrots and sticks. But altogether, the authors underscore what is already known: the leverage of the outside aid community is limited and, without the presence of reform-minded elites, almost nonexistent.
Related
As Afghanistan has shown, keeping the peace in foreign lands requires a variety of tools--some of which Washington just does not have. Rather than avoid peacekeeping entirely, the U.S. government ends up sending in elite military units that get bogged down for years. Developing a constabulary force would be a better answer.
President Bush's case for war on Iraq overlooks a very real danger: if pushed to the wall, Saddam Hussein may resort to using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. Such a strike may not be likely, or may not succeed, but attacking Saddam is the best way to guarantee that it will happen. And Washington has done far too little to prepare for it.
The debates over Kosovo blurred the old divisions between liberals and conservatives, but they did not rise above an even older split in American politics and foreign policy: the enduring divide between a hawkish South and a dovish North. Regional differences based on culture and values have made Greater New England the heartland of opposition to foreign wars and the U.S. military establishment since the 1700s; they have also made the South a bastion of interventionism. All too often, the regional divides over U.S. foreign policy have just been a reprise of the Civil War -- and they are a recipe for paralysis.

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