Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States
This volume affirms the widely shared view that global security now hinges on the ability of the international community to strengthen weak and failing states. Exploring the causes and consequences of state weakness in the developing world, these experts focus on "poorly performing states" -- those that exhibit the bleakest features of poverty and deficient government and are thus most prone to collapse. They argue that these troubled states all too easily become sites for illicit transnational networks and regionally destabilizing violence but are largely neglected by U.S. aid programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Account, which direct funds to "best performers." Corruption and state-sponsored predation are inevitably part of the story of state failure, but, the authors argue, the international community has also played a role in "supporting, emboldening, and replicating" ineffective government in weak and failing states. In a useful chapter, Carol Lancaster presents a set of principles to guide U.S. foreign assistance, emphasizing a case-by-case approach and utilization of the full array of carrots and sticks. But altogether, the authors underscore what is already known: the leverage of the outside aid community is limited and, without the presence of reform-minded elites, almost nonexistent.
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Jimmy Carter's high-profile parachutes for peace earn scorn from some and admiration from others. From Haiti to North Korea, the ubiquitous former president helps resolve disputes with his unshakable confidence in the power of moral suasion. But Carter's penchant for bucking U.S. foreign policy has strained his relations with the Washington establishment, and the Clinton administration has not always treated him with the respect he deserves. Lost in the controversy are the humanitarian achievements on which his reputation will ultimately rest.
Richard Holbrooke's gripping memoir shows how he improvised a makeshift peace in what was left of Bosnia despite a timorous Pentagon, a reluctant president, waweirding allies, and brutal ethnic cleansers. But the Dayton Accord came too late.
The difference between the factions in Bosnia is not morality, as the Bosnian Muslims and Western press insist, but power and opportunity. All have the same goal: to avoid living as a minority. All have committed crimes against other ethnic groups. Despite its claims of neutrality and preaching against military solutions, the United States has favored the Bosnian Muslims, keeping silent as they launched offensives from U.N.-guarded safe areas. Since air strikes cannot resolve the conflict, the United States must discourage violence by all sides and let Russia--the one country Serbs trust--take the lead in negotiations.

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