State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
Woodward's trilogy on the Bush administration at war is essential, and compelling, reading. The latest volume tells a depressingly familiar story of dysfunctional government: the president would rather swap jokes than ask hard questions about what is going wrong with the war he launched; the secretary of defense is more concerned with accumulating power than with thinking sensibly about what to do with it. Part of the story is Woodward himself. As court chronicler of the Bush White House, he produced a mildly flattering portrait of the administration in volume one, Bush at War, which reads curiously beside volume three. He is at times clearly being used to burnish egos and take revenge; it appears, for example, that Condoleezza Rice let slip George Tenet's "slam dunk" comment regarding the case for Iraq's having weapons of mass destruction, so Tenet reports that he warned Rice in July 2001 of al Qaeda's plans to attack the United States. We are also asked to believe that Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan single-handedly sorted out the April 2001 incident with China over a downed U.S. spy plane -- because that is the story he told Woodward, who does not seem to have checked it out with anyone else. State of Denial is a must read, but it must be read with care.
Related
In The Assassins' Gate, George Packer presents a searing account of the Bush administration's failures in Iraq -- and of his own disillusionment as a liberal hawk who supported toppling Saddam Hussein.
In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen shoots down the myth that politicians should not meddle with the military during wartime. Focusing on four great civilian leaders, he shows that the opposite is true: disasters can result when politicians are not involved enough.
The basic assumptions of U.S. policy toward the Gulf demand rethinking. The Pentagon pays up to $60 billion a year to protect the import of $30 billion worth of oil that would flow anyway. Playing the role of regional hegemon ties America to troubled regimes and leaves it out on a limb, while allies sit back. Washington must hedge against inevitable political change in the region by spreading the burden and the say, reversing arms proliferation, and encouraging the Gulf states to come up with some security of their own.
