Beyond Nucler Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation
Future historians contemplating the gravest failures of our day will almost certainly place high on their list the blithe indifference of the major powers, beginning with the United States, to the opportunity after the Cold War to chart a safer course in what remains a nuclear world. Relieved of the pressure to race one another, the nuclear haves could have seized the moment to create what Arbatov and Dvorkin call a "nuclear partnership" or a "mutual nuclear assurance strategy." Not only have they failed to do this, but they have also, with the United States in the lead, dismantled the frail architecture of arms control agreements built during the Cold War. In the process, they have made nuclear weapons more "usable" at a time when these weapons are useless in addressing the core security threats of the day. All this and the alternative path not (yet) taken, Arbatov and Dvorkin, two of the most sophisticated thinkers on these issues in either Russia or the United States, lay out in a simple, lucid, and powerful fashion.
Related
The USA continues to under-estimate the danger to world security of continuing nuclear proliferation. As it normalizes relations with the USSR, the USA should "undertake a fresh assessment of the worldwide non-proliferation effort".
"Gorbachev's new thinking does not indicate that the Soviet Union wishes to abandon its role as a world power, but it provides a different picture of the world and redefines the Soviet role in it". Discusses (1) the failure of Brezhnev's foreign policy (2) Gorbachev's redefinition of Soviet thinking on international relations (3) new principles of defensive sufficiency (4) effects on arms control (5) domestic motivations. Professor of political science, Harvard University.
Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.