Beyond Nucler Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation
Future historians contemplating the gravest failures of our day will almost certainly place high on their list the blithe indifference of the major powers, beginning with the United States, to the opportunity after the Cold War to chart a safer course in what remains a nuclear world. Relieved of the pressure to race one another, the nuclear haves could have seized the moment to create what Arbatov and Dvorkin call a "nuclear partnership" or a "mutual nuclear assurance strategy." Not only have they failed to do this, but they have also, with the United States in the lead, dismantled the frail architecture of arms control agreements built during the Cold War. In the process, they have made nuclear weapons more "usable" at a time when these weapons are useless in addressing the core security threats of the day. All this and the alternative path not (yet) taken, Arbatov and Dvorkin, two of the most sophisticated thinkers on these issues in either Russia or the United States, lay out in a simple, lucid, and powerful fashion.
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The Chechnya misadventure unmasked what Russia's armed forces have known for awhile: the heir to the once-vaunted Soviet military is in shambles. Years of cutbacks in Russia's military budgets, worsened by rapid inflation, have crippled morale, the development of new weapons, maintenance, and training. At the upper echelons, there is now an exodus of talented and experienced officers; in the lower ranks, desertion and draft evasion are widespread. Nevertheless, the Russian military has largely remained above politics and helped to stabilize the nation amid reform. The United States would do well to press for an honest and open military-to-military relationship with Russia. One day, a grave nuclear threat may require it.
Gorbachev's foreign policy has the same aim as that of his predecessors, with the addition of tactical flexibility and sophisticated PR, and he is in more control of it. Arms control policy is the one difference, but he will get nowhere as long as he insists on linking progress with the banning of SDI.
