Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia
The essential question about Russia today is not what has happened to reform, but why has the state -- notwithstanding Vladimir Putin's maneuverings -- been unable to pull itself together and deliver for its citizens what a state should? Stoner-Weiss, who knows Russia region by region and who for this book interviewed in 72 of the 89, believes that the answer lies in the will and ability of regions to defy the central government on key economic policy issues, that their defiance depends heavily on local businesspeople who made off quite literally as bandits during the collapse of the Soviet state and who do not want reform to threaten their gains, and that the root of all of this can be traced back to ill-conceived aspects of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, which were mightily enhanced by Boris Yeltsin's privatization schemes. Given the essence of the problem -- a state too little embedded in society and too susceptible to "capture" by "societal elements" -- Stoner-Weiss does not think Putin's moves to impose control will work. The book is short, and the argument tight.
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Although Russia has projected itself more forcefully on the world stage since the beginning of the Putin era, its foreign policy still lacks any sort of grand strategic vision. Russian leaders continue to squabble over issues from NATO expansion to the world economy. But they are particularly concerned about Russia's identity, especially with regard to the post-Soviet states. If the Bush administration fails to devise a coherent policy of its own toward its former rival, it may face serious problems down the road.
The dance symbolizes the over-militarization of the superpowers, leading to stagnation in the USSR and undermining the USA economically. Notes some political constraints (demonstrated by the dismissal of Yeltsin) on Gorbachev's domestic programme, as well as his conduct of foreign affairs. By 1987, Reagan faced 'new thinking' on the part of the USSR, a Democrat-controlled Senate and the Iran-Contra affair, as well as economic problems, a major cause of which has been military expenditures. These trends led to a cautious improvement in superpower relations in 1987.
Moscow with a Soviet hangover tests the patience even of those who most wish to engage it. As Chechnya festers, privatization lags, and the world contemplates the possibility of a communist president in the Kremlin dreaming of empire, some ridicule the notion of partnership. Russian chauvinists paint America as the enemy, but the interests of the two countries after the Cold War are compatible. The West should focus its attention--and Russia's--on common interests like nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, regional peace, and full participati0n in the world economy. America should deal rationally with irrationalities in a nation finding its way.
