Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary
Wittenberg weighs in on a long-standing puzzle: Why, like a watermark on the printed page, do partisan loyalties survive within a society across generations and notwithstanding vast historical change -- in France, for example, from back across the Fifth, Fourth, and Third Republics, back even to the French Revolution, and maybe before? Even more striking is the mystery of how the loyalties prevalent in central Europe in the early twentieth century, particularly on the political right, survived the long communist interlude only to resurface almost intact in our own day. In Hungary, he locates his explanation in the role of the churches (Catholic and Calvinist). Local priests and pastors, lay leaders, and believers, by playing a skillful cat-and-mouse game with the regime and its tamed church leadership, preserved their earlier mass allegiance, including the potential political configurations within it. In so doing, they provided a parapet behind which many avoided assimilation into the new socialist order. This is a rigorous explanation for a hard case, with relevance for other authoritarian transitions, but it is less convincing in the wider world of partisan persistence.
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Although Russia has projected itself more forcefully on the world stage since the beginning of the Putin era, its foreign policy still lacks any sort of grand strategic vision. Russian leaders continue to squabble over issues from NATO expansion to the world economy. But they are particularly concerned about Russia's identity, especially with regard to the post-Soviet states. If the Bush administration fails to devise a coherent policy of its own toward its former rival, it may face serious problems down the road.
The dance symbolizes the over-militarization of the superpowers, leading to stagnation in the USSR and undermining the USA economically. Notes some political constraints (demonstrated by the dismissal of Yeltsin) on Gorbachev's domestic programme, as well as his conduct of foreign affairs. By 1987, Reagan faced 'new thinking' on the part of the USSR, a Democrat-controlled Senate and the Iran-Contra affair, as well as economic problems, a major cause of which has been military expenditures. These trends led to a cautious improvement in superpower relations in 1987.
Moscow with a Soviet hangover tests the patience even of those who most wish to engage it. As Chechnya festers, privatization lags, and the world contemplates the possibility of a communist president in the Kremlin dreaming of empire, some ridicule the notion of partnership. Russian chauvinists paint America as the enemy, but the interests of the two countries after the Cold War are compatible. The West should focus its attention--and Russia's--on common interests like nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, regional peace, and full participati0n in the world economy. America should deal rationally with irrationalities in a nation finding its way.
