The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler
This book is a model of how good historical analysis can usefully inform current policy debates. Record, a defense expert at the U.S. Air Force's Air War College, examines the use of the "Munich analogy" in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. He begins with a concise but sophisticated explanation of why France and the United Kingdom appeased Hitler in the 1930s. Aversion to another Great War, a misreading of Hitler's aims, the lack of appropriate military preparation, and a sense of guilt over the harsh Treaty of Versailles all played a role. Given what was known at the time, he argues, appeasement was not irrational; it failed catastrophically because Hitler proved unappeasable and enduring. Spooked by the consequences of this failure, Western leaders have since publicly invoked the Munich analogy -- applying it to conflicts in Korea, Suez, Vietnam, Grenada, Nicaragua, Kosovo, Iraq, and elsewhere -- to argue for military action. But as Record shows, the case of Nazi Germany was highly exceptional: Munich was not analogous to any of these cases, nor does it apply today. Thus he concludes bluntly, "American presidents should cease invocation of the Munich analogy to justify threatened or actual uses of force." This book should be required reading not only in universities but in the White House as well.
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"The future of Yugoslavia is by no means certain. But it is also by no means doomed to violence and anarchy. There exist strong internal and external motivations for a peaceful resolution of the current Yugoslav crisis". The best course of the USA and the West is to assist the interests of "those committed to political negotiation", and to continue to hold out "technical, managerial, and, where appropriate, financial aid to those republics that make sincere efforts to find a common political solution and are committed to true economic reforms".
In our nuclear age, questions of defense planning-once a fairly simple matter of estimating the amounts expended by the various nations, totting up numbers of mobilizable men, evaluating weapons (as in Janes Fighting Ships), appreciating the contributions of allies and so on-have passed into a surrealistic sphere of bluff, counterbluff, nightmare and potential extinction of the human race. Reassuringly, neither of the superpowers, even when one held a monopoly or a vast preponderance of nuclear power, has so far been willing to use, or to threaten the use of, the superweapon in pursuit of its political aims-even (as in Vietnam) against a tiny nonnuclear adversary. (Khrushchev's empty threat at the time of Suez was the exception that proves the rule.) Indeed, its possession has so far simply resulted in a perpetuation of the political status quo. Any negotiated arrangement between the superpowers on the limitation or even reduction of their nuclear panoply will also, most likely, only be possible on such a basis.
Responding to Charles G. Boyd on the Balkan crisis, author Noel Malcolm, professor Norman Cigar, and journalist David Rieff argue the Serbs bear the primary guilt; William E. Odom sees an opportunity that NATO must seize; Boyd replies.

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