George Kennan: A Study of Character
George Kennan is one of the most significant and complex figures in the study of U.S. foreign policy, and Lukacs has written a moving and thoughtful appreciation of this extraordinary man. Kennan is best known as the Mr. X whose "Long Telegram" provided the intellectual basis for the United States' containment strategy during the Cold War; Lukacs notes that this represented but one incident in a rich, varied, and productive career. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, Kennan's graceful but biting account of U.S. foreign policy in that period, remains a classic in the field -- a devastating account of the moralism, rigidity, and wishful thinking with which the United States confronted some of the most dangerous and horrible events in the history of the human race. Still, Lukacs would have written a better book, and done Kennan a greater service, if he had kept his inner hagiographer on a shorter leash. Kennan was an intricate figure whose attitudes toward democracy would benefit from a more searching discussion than Lukacs provides. Nevertheless, as a spare and elegant introduction to a distinctively American thinker and writer, Lukacs' Kennan is an important contribution. It will, if nothing else, make many readers nostalgic for an era when more students of U.S. foreign policy were historians and intellectuals rather than, as the Democratic Party figures Rahm Emanuel and Bruce Reed recently put it, "hacks and wonks."
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China's reform policies have created economic opportunities, but they have also unleashed political tensions. Some U.S. strategists advocate a containment strategy, yet such a strategy is both undesirable and infeasible. America's fortunes in Asia depend on the evolution of a China that is secure, cohesive, reform-oriented, and open to the world. Failed reform could easily lead to a nationalistic, obstructionist China. In recent years, Washington, while trying to engage the People's Republic, has driven it into a corner over human rights. America must develop a long-term strategy to integrate China into the world community and avert serious damage to this crucial bilateral relationship. And it must begin to do so now.
Both in public and underground, Iranians are debating the legitimacy of the Islamic state that Khomeini built. Students challenge the notion that Islam has all the answers but evince pride in an Iran free of the shah and under no foreign master. The religious and secular elites are increasingly willing to contemplate pluralism and openness to the world, though most makers of the revolution remain obdurate and appeal to anti-Americanism to stir up the masses. Washington needs to listen to the new voices of Iran.
Foreign policy is not ordinarily conducted in controlled laboratory circumstances, but 1982 gave Ronald Reagan that opportunity to an unusual degree. A self-confessed anti-communist, he had come to the White House insisting on the requirement for a hard line, and in his first year he had capitalized on it by winning congressional support for a five-year defense plan of $1.357 trillion (in 1983 dollars)--in peacetime and in a period of economic crisis, no less. On the eve of his second year, there occurred an event--the declaration of military law in Poland--which lent itself well to validating the premise of Soviet menace and mendacity on which the President's whole anti-communist stance rested. In those conditions of evident domestic support for a world view freshly authenticated by the main enemy, Reagan had an excellent chance to prove that his analysis of the central problem of American foreign policy was sound. With one year of experience under his belt, and two years to go before elections, 1982 seemed destined to be a good year.
