Losing Iraq
The current debate over the United States' failures in Iraq needs to go beyond bumper-sticker conclusions -- no more preemption, no more democracy promotion, no more nation building -- and acrimonious finger-pointing. Only by carefully considering where U.S. leaders, institutions, and policies have been at fault can valuable lessons be learned and future debacles avoided.
James Dobbins replies:
Tony Smith's objections are directed not at my article but at a series of RAND studies on the subject of nation building. He apparently holds these books, which were published well after the invasion (in late 2003 and 2007), somehow responsible for the decision to invade Iraq. Far from supporting the logic of that intervention, these studies showed that success was improbable at any cost the United States was likely to pay. A draft of the first volume was made available to Ambassador Paul Bremer shortly after he was named to head the Coalition Provisional Authority. In his memoirs, Bremer recounts being startled by the study's conclusion that the stabilization of Iraq might require up to 500,000 troops. He immediately sent Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld a copy of the summary chapter and spoke to President George W. Bush about it. Neither man seems to have considered this insight.
The RAND studies emphasize the importance not only of manpower, money, and time but also of international legitimacy and regional support for any nation-building enterprise, none of which was available in Iraq. These volumes do not endorse "U.S. progressive imperialism." Instead, they conclude that the UN has a substantially higher success rate at nation building than the United States and thus should be the nation builder of first resort. Smith charges that these books gloss over local circumstances. They do emphasize factors that are common to most operations and subject to some control, rather than those that are unique and immutable. Yet all 16 case studies begin with a section outlining the local circumstances Smith finds lacking.
It appears that Smith believes nation building to be both impossible and immoral. Neither is remotely true. Tens of millions of people in places such as Albania, Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor, El Salvador, Germany, Japan, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Sierra Leone are living peacefully, most under democratically elected governments, because UN, NATO, European, or U.S. troops came in, separated contending factions, disarmed former combatants, promoted reconstruction, held elections, installed freely chosen governments, and remained long enough to see that these took hold. It would be a tragedy of the first order if setbacks in Iraq were to lead the United States to abandon support for efforts to end the bloodshed and promote representative government in Afghanistan, Congo, or Darfur. I do not absolve myself of responsibility for the failure in Iraq; my concluding sentence makes that clear. Even those who thought the war a bad idea from the beginning could have been more vocal. My essay suggests that we be so in the future.
Ludovic Hood and I seem to largely agree. I did not dwell on personal responsibility because doing so would not take us very far now. If all we can learn from the mistakes in Iraq is not to reelect Bush, then we will not have yielded much. I did identify the personal characteristics that marred the performance of the president and the secretary of defense, however, and urged that leaders without such traits be chosen next time.
Related
Once again events in the Middle East and adjacent areas dominated the world situation in 1980. To Americans, the inability to obtain the release of the 52 diplomats held hostage in Tehran since November 1979 was particularly dismaying. But of even greater underlying importance was the inability to mount a firm allied or regional response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, where a grinding and brutal war went on with no sign of ending. In the fall, military conflict broke out between Iraq and Iran, again with no end in sight and with consequences for oil supply that by the end of the year had further tightened market prospects, and caused a new jump in oil prices. Finally, the Camp David process--which the Carter Administration had regarded as its greatest achievement--bogged down over issues of autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza that lay at the core of any hope for settlement of the issues between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
There was some disappointment, though no great surprise, at the failure of the November 1985 Geneva summit to provide much hope of agreement on nuclear arms. But there was general satisfaction, in Europe as elsewhere, at the understanding reached there for regular consultations on regional conflicts.
For twenty-five years, in a good many remote odd spots in the world, the United States has been locked in battle; or has been seconding some distant and sometimes dubious friend; or trying, by promising help, to deter the start of the trouble altogether. With so many and such far-flung commitments and no sign of letup, it is only natural that there should be a lively debate about their number and extent and how they fit our capabilities. The frustrations of these 25 years of engagements in remote wars, and not only the present long-drawn-out and uncertain struggle in Viet Nam, encourage a new isolationism.
