Public Footprints in Private Markets
The massive growth of sovereign wealth funds -- pools of capital controlled by governments and invested in private markets abroad -- should not cause alarm. But it does raise legitimate questions for the United States, pointing to the need for new policy principles for both the funds and the countries in which they invest.
ROBERT M. KIMMITT is Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
In 1953, eight years before its independence from the United Kingdom, Kuwait established the Kuwait Investment Board to invest its surplus oil revenue. That was perhaps the first-ever "sovereign wealth fund" (SWF), although the term would not exist for another 50 years. SWFs are large pools of capital controlled by a government and invested in private markets abroad. Today, they are growing rapidly in both number and size. Twelve SWFs been established since 2005, and altogether SWFs control roughly $2.5 trillion -- a figure now growing, according to some estimates, by $1 trillion a year.
These developments should not cause alarm, but they do raise legitimate policy questions. Governments should consider the implications of SWFs' growing importance with calm and precision. Many concerns, aired frequently in policy debates and prominently in the media, have been exaggerated, in part because of a lack of understanding of SWFs and other vehicles for sovereign investment. A fuller picture of SWFs' history, purpose, size, growth, and broader systemic implications is needed. Such an understanding, along with a set of clear policy principles for both SWFs and the countries in which they invest, will help preserve openness to foreign investment and promote financial stability worldwide.
THE FOUR SOVEREIGNS
To frame this policy discussion, it is useful to differentiate among four kinds of sovereign investment: international reserves, public pension funds, state-owned enterprises, and SWFs. International reserves, as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are external assets that are controlled by and readily available to finance ministries and central banks for direct financing of international payment imbalances. Countries typically keep reserves on hand to cushion an export shortfall or to intervene to defend the currency in a financial crisis. Reserves are by definition invested in highly liquid and marketable securities, which usually means highly rated industrialized-country government bonds.
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
In less than five years Japan will have a population profile like Florida's. Indeed, Japan's population is aging faster than that of any other country. A future with only two workers for each retiree will force radical change. It will shrink savings, turn the trade surplus to deficit, and drive more industry overseas. These demographic and economic factors will push Japan toward an increasingly independent foreign policy, causing friction with America. Tokyo and Washington must seek new arrangements cognizant of a maturing Japan.
The growing economic disputes between the USA and Japan could develop into a serious political conflict. The 'Japan problem' is rooted in two fictions (1) that the Japanese state has central organs of government which bear ultimate responsibility for economic and political decision-making, whereas the Japanese system is a collection of different hierarchies without a centre (2) that Japan has a free-market capitalist economy, whereas it is actually a 'capitalist development state', characterized by a partnership between central bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Fixed trade commitments could be part of the solution.
The principal problem with which the world's economies must deal during the coming decade is the unsustainable imbalance of international trade. The United States cannot continue to have annual trade deficits of more than $100 billion, financed by an ever-increasing inflow of foreign capital. The U.S. trade deficit will therefore soon have to shrink and, as it does, the other countries of the world will experience a corresponding reduction in their trade surpluses. Indeed, within the next decade the United States will undoubtedly exchange its trade deficit for a trade surplus. The challenge is to achieve this rebalancing of world demand in a way that avoids both a decline in real economic activity and an increase in the rate of inflation.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.