Defense Dollars
To the Editor:
Richard Betts ("A Disciplined Defense," November/December 2007) laments that most "organizations associated with mainstream policy thinking," instead of arguing for military budget rationality, have been cowed into silence. He refers to recent proposals by my own organization -- the Institute for Policy Studies, which has been known over the years for its far-reaching proposals to scale back the military budget -- that focus on a set of cuts amounting to only about $56 billion, or 11 percent of the total. Betts is right that this $56 billion is only the low-hanging fruit.
Our report "A Unified Security Budget" also includes a set of recommendations for how to reinvest these funds in what Betts rightly calls the "comparatively starved" accounts for such nonmilitary tools as diplomacy, foreign aid, international organizations, and peacekeeping missions. Implementing these recommendations would signal a commitment to writing a new chapter in U.S. foreign relations.
Betts' proposal for Washington -- "Half a trillion dollars is more than enough" -- is still too much. It would leave the core infrastructure of the U.S. empire in place, in the form of more than 700 military installations spread across the globe, more than for any previous empire in history. The Pentagon's plans to turn these into what the journalist Robert Kaplan calls a "stealth" empire -- moving the pieces around and substituting more mobile, less visible "lily pads" for some of them -- will not change this fact. The only way of convincing the world that we are actually abandoning what Betts describes as the "dangerously misguided" policy of running a post-Cold War empire is by acting, visibly, to shrink it.
For this reason, the Institute for Policy Studies has now embedded its zero-sum rebalancing of military and nonmilitary security resources in a broader framework. This "just security" framework lays out a security budget that adds key elements to the core recommendations of the report "A Unified Security Budget." The first and most obvious is ending the war in Iraq. Cuts in subsidies for the arms trade is another important one. And finally, the institute recommends scaling back U.S. military bases in the near term by one-third. Our "just security" proposal outlines a way that our $600 billion budget could be cut by a third, too. We look forward to engaging in the debate we hope Betts has finally begun.
MIRIAM PEMBERTON
Research Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies
Related
Nineteen sixty-nine may be remembered as the year Americans woke up to the importance of an issue that was to be a dominant one in the 1970s. The question of Viet Nam still had the emotional clout. The great ABM debate still captured most of the headlines. But more and more people were beginning to see that bigger and more permanent than both of these was the question of whether America's military spending could be brought under more rational control. In the winter of 1969 it became increasingly clear that we had to find a way to reorient our national priorities so that imperative human needs on the home front were not always being shunted aside because of the claims of "national security." No longer could it be successfully argued that we could afford the needed amounts of "guns and butter." A difficult choice-or at least choices-had to be made, and would have to be made repeatedly, for many years to come.
America has reached a tepid consensus that accepts a decline of U.S. power in the world as inevitable. Other nations, better judges of power, treat the United States as a hegemon. America should pursue a vision of benevolent hegemony as bold as Reagan's in the 1970s and wield its authority unabashedly. The defense budget should be increased dramatically, citizens should be educated to appreciate the military's vital work abroad, and moral clarity should direct a foreign policy that puts the heat on dictators and authoritarian regimes. Republicans are best fitted to carry out this foreign policy of national honor and elevated patriotism.
Uncertainty is necessarily the lot of the planner, since the deals with the future. Uncertainty can never be completely removed. However, it can be compensated for, and to do so is a continuing responsibility of those who plan military forces. Primarily this can be done by insuring, in so far as we can, that future weapons and forces will be adaptable to the right range of defense needs or, as defense planners often put it, by insuring flexibility.
