The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe
Since 9/11, politicians and analysts from across the political spectrum have called for a "new Marshall Plan" to help fight the extremism in the Middle East -- much in the way the original effort helped defeat communism in postwar Europe. Behrman's timely new history of the United States' unprecedented aid program helps elucidate where the analogy works and where it does not. As his title implies, Behrman shares Dean Acheson's view that the Marshall Plan was "one of the greatest and most honorable adventures in history." Whereas revisionist historians, such as Alan Milward, have argued that Europe in 1947 mainly had a balance-of-payments problem and would likely have recovered anyway, Behrman argues that generous U.S. support -- $13 billion over four years, or $100 billion in today's dollars -- was necessary to rebuild Europe's productive capacity, entice former adversaries to cooperate, and restore Europeans' confidence in capitalism. Behrman's florid narrative sometimes approaches hagiography, but the research is impressive, and it is hard to argue with his basic point: that the Marshall Plan was a model of enlightened self-interest.
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"The future of Yugoslavia is by no means certain. But it is also by no means doomed to violence and anarchy. There exist strong internal and external motivations for a peaceful resolution of the current Yugoslav crisis". The best course of the USA and the West is to assist the interests of "those committed to political negotiation", and to continue to hold out "technical, managerial, and, where appropriate, financial aid to those republics that make sincere efforts to find a common political solution and are committed to true economic reforms".
In our nuclear age, questions of defense planning-once a fairly simple matter of estimating the amounts expended by the various nations, totting up numbers of mobilizable men, evaluating weapons (as in Janes Fighting Ships), appreciating the contributions of allies and so on-have passed into a surrealistic sphere of bluff, counterbluff, nightmare and potential extinction of the human race. Reassuringly, neither of the superpowers, even when one held a monopoly or a vast preponderance of nuclear power, has so far been willing to use, or to threaten the use of, the superweapon in pursuit of its political aims-even (as in Vietnam) against a tiny nonnuclear adversary. (Khrushchev's empty threat at the time of Suez was the exception that proves the rule.) Indeed, its possession has so far simply resulted in a perpetuation of the political status quo. Any negotiated arrangement between the superpowers on the limitation or even reduction of their nuclear panoply will also, most likely, only be possible on such a basis.
Responding to Charles G. Boyd on the Balkan crisis, author Noel Malcolm, professor Norman Cigar, and journalist David Rieff argue the Serbs bear the primary guilt; William E. Odom sees an opportunity that NATO must seize; Boyd replies.

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