Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed
Here are two books by a close student of postcommunist transitions. The first, an extensive revision and expansion of an earlier book, examines all the former communist countries to emerge from the Soviet bloc, describing and evaluating the transition from centrally planned to market economies and analyzing what did and did not work. An important finding is that radical reform produced better and more durable economic performance than gradual reform and also contributed to establishing democratic political institutions, even though the immediate postreform period was painful.
The second book focuses on Russia alone. It is largely a chronological history of Russia's economic reforms, starting with those introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Not surprisingly, it contains some of the same analytic themes as the first book. In Aslund's view, capitalism has been effectively established in Russia, bolstered by a thriving private sector in a thriving economy. Russia's political institutions, in contrast, have reverted to a tsarist-type authoritarianism under President Vladimir Putin. The book lucidly explains the reasons for these contrasting outcomes in Russia, which are markedly different from those in most of the postcommunist eastern European countries. Aslund sees the two developments as incompatible in the long run and places his bets on an evolution toward democracy.
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Ukraine has yet to solve the challenge of life after communism. Hyperinflation is just a memory and democracy is well entrenched, but production is declining, state industries remain unsold, and investors have largely stayed away. With nationalists ascendant in Russia, Ukraine needs Western money and diplomatic backing to preserve its independence and keep reform on track. A free, democratic Ukraine can serve as a model for Russia, prevent a new Soviet Union, and promote stability among its neighbors. A civil war between its Russified east and its more Ukrainian west, or its absorption into a new Russian empire, would reverberate throughout Europe.
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms have unleashed an unprecedented tide of protests and demonstrations across the U.S.S.R. in which national grievances occupy a central place alongside economic unrest. From Alma Ata to Abkhazia, from Tallinn to Tbilisi, virtually no region of this vast and complex multinational society appears immune to the rising tide of national self-assertion. Whether in the form of anti-Russian demonstrations, as in Kazakhstan and Georgia, or in the emergence of new sociopolitical movements demanding greater economic and political autonomy, such as the Popular Fronts of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, or in more volatile outbursts of communal violence that have resulted in a tragic loss of lives and many thousands of refugees, as in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan-all pose a growing threat to Gorbachev's leadership and to the future of his reforms.
Russia's era of romantic democracy is over. Boris Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 elections marked the rise of a new class of oligarchs who have profited from post-Cold War chaos. But Westerners who predict a return to authoritarianism and cultural stagnation overlook how far Russia has come since the late 1980s, and how it has opened to the world. It is not the Soviet Union, nor the land of the czars. In the short term, most Russians cannot hope for much, especially from their leaders. But with its political reforms, 98 percent privatized economy, and educated, urban population, Russia has a great deal going for it-maybe more than China.

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