The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War
Mann, one of the leading students of contemporary U.S. foreign policy, whose is the best study yet of the Bush-Cheney foreign policy team, has written an extraordinary account of Ronald Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union that sheds considerable light on the end of the Cold War. The Reagan Mann shows the reader is as disengaged and as ideological as his critics have frequently charged; yet time and again, he overruled his advisers as he followed his own vision and intuition. Driving Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisers to distraction with endlessly recycled platitudes and stale jokes about Soviet life -- and allowing Nancy Reagan's astrologer to set the time for the signing of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty -- Reagan nevertheless imposed a consistent vision of his own on U.S.-Soviet relations. In his first term, he defied liberals and realists to put the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union back at the center of international politics; in his second, he defied conservatives and realists to push toward a new relationship with a Soviet regime that was steadily changing. Next to Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz is the figure who emerges from this well-researched and well-constructed book as the American who best understood what was happening in the Soviet Union at this time.
Related
In American Vertigo, Bernard-Henri Lévy updates Tocqueville and defends the United States against anti-Americanism, while in Überpower, Josef Joffe counsels Washington on how to maintain its primacy.
The difference between the factions in Bosnia is not morality, as the Bosnian Muslims and Western press insist, but power and opportunity. All have the same goal: to avoid living as a minority. All have committed crimes against other ethnic groups. Despite its claims of neutrality and preaching against military solutions, the United States has favored the Bosnian Muslims, keeping silent as they launched offensives from U.N.-guarded safe areas. Since air strikes cannot resolve the conflict, the United States must discourage violence by all sides and let Russia--the one country Serbs trust--take the lead in negotiations.
The Cold War culture of military restraint has given way to increasing atrocities. By remaining a passive witness in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, and Chechnya, the United States damages its moral economy. Yet none of these conflicts sufficiently threatens U.S. interests to rouse the nation to arms. The United States should therefore return to the calculating siege craft common before Napoleon, which stressed minimal casualties, partial results, and patience. Every war need not be a heroic national crusade.
