Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe
The Nazis are rightly better remembered for their capacity to wage war than for their ability to consolidate peace. In this impressive work, Mazower demonstrates just how incompetent they were at the latter task. Indeed, for a party so obsessed with the virtue of order, the Nazis were surprisingly disorganized and inefficient when it came to trying to govern those whose armies they had so efficiently defeated. It was not just that the brutal tactics of mass execution (including of many of the most talented members of society), forced labor, and the inhumane treatment of local populations turned those populations against them and made governance more difficult. It was also that the Nazis do not seem even to have given much serious thought to the imperial role they were so determined to acquire. The Nazi occupation was improvised and disorganized, and it vastly underestimated the political, logistical, and demographic challenges it would face. There were not enough ethnic Germans to rule the vast conquered regions by an iron fist alone, yet the Nazis' tactics made any alternative to such rule impossible. "Germany," Mazower points out, "could have racial purity or imperial domination, but it could not have both."
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"The future of Yugoslavia is by no means certain. But it is also by no means doomed to violence and anarchy. There exist strong internal and external motivations for a peaceful resolution of the current Yugoslav crisis". The best course of the USA and the West is to assist the interests of "those committed to political negotiation", and to continue to hold out "technical, managerial, and, where appropriate, financial aid to those republics that make sincere efforts to find a common political solution and are committed to true economic reforms".
In our nuclear age, questions of defense planning-once a fairly simple matter of estimating the amounts expended by the various nations, totting up numbers of mobilizable men, evaluating weapons (as in Janes Fighting Ships), appreciating the contributions of allies and so on-have passed into a surrealistic sphere of bluff, counterbluff, nightmare and potential extinction of the human race. Reassuringly, neither of the superpowers, even when one held a monopoly or a vast preponderance of nuclear power, has so far been willing to use, or to threaten the use of, the superweapon in pursuit of its political aims-even (as in Vietnam) against a tiny nonnuclear adversary. (Khrushchev's empty threat at the time of Suez was the exception that proves the rule.) Indeed, its possession has so far simply resulted in a perpetuation of the political status quo. Any negotiated arrangement between the superpowers on the limitation or even reduction of their nuclear panoply will also, most likely, only be possible on such a basis.
Responding to Charles G. Boyd on the Balkan crisis, author Noel Malcolm, professor Norman Cigar, and journalist David Rieff argue the Serbs bear the primary guilt; William E. Odom sees an opportunity that NATO must seize; Boyd replies.

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