NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999
The path to Kosovo's independence, proclaimed in February 2008, was paved by the 78-day NATO bombing campaign of 1999, which eventually led to Serbia's withdrawal from the province and the subsequent UN trusteeship. NATO's Gamble provides good background to the current situation, but the author's main interest is in examining Kosovo as a case study in the application of military coercion, and airpower specifically. His main thesis is that NATO went to war without a strategy, having never reconciled its internal differences over whether to emphasize force or diplomacy, whether to act under its own authority or only under a UN mandate, and whether to bomb "strategic" targets, such as Serbia's leadership in Belgrade, or focus on more politically acceptable military targets in the field. A captain in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, Henriksen has little patience for the messy nature of an ad hoc war fought under the direction of 19 countries with very different strategic cultures. He understands that fighting as an alliance inevitably requires compromise and flexibility but insists that NATO could have done better -- and had better do so if it faces similar situations in the future. The story of NATO in Kosovo demonstrates the benefits of fighting as a coalition -- but also the costs.
Related
In "Saving NATO From Europe," (November/December 2004), Jeffrey L. Cimbalo warns that a dagger is pointed at the heart of the Atlantic alliance, and the murder weapon is the European Union's draft constitution. Ratification of that document, Cimbalo asserts, would have "profound and troubling implications for the transatlantic alliance and for future U.S. influence in Europe." Washington, he believes, should "end its uncritical support for European integration" and work with its friends in Europe to halt the EU process and save NATO from an untimely death.
In recent months, many observers have concluded that the United States and Europe are on divergent paths and that the transatlantic alliance is crumbling. In spite of some real differences, however, American and European attitudes remain remarkably similar on most key issues. Basing policy on the false assumption of transatlantic divorce would only make it a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Paris summit of the heads of the nine member-governments of the European Communities last October presented another in a long series of theatrical non-events that have come to characterize international politics in Western Europe. To be sure, the final declaration of the meetings paid lip-service to a list of central problems that now confront the EC group: the need to coördinate economic and monetary policies and to establish communal regional, social, energy, environmental and industrial policies; and finally the desirability of creating institutional structures for the development of common policies toward the outside world. But the vague final reference to the transformation of the current institutions into a "European union" by the end of this decade was an attempt to camouflage continued political divisions among the nine and the paralysis of each of their governments.
