Architects of Delusion: Europe, America, and the Iraq War
Serfaty, an expert on Europe and U.S. foreign policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Old Dominion University, brings a historical perspective to this study of transatlantic relations in regard to the Iraq war. Drawing on an intimate knowledge of postwar European history, he sees continuities with the past in the way key players on both sides approached the issue: France, for example, concluding that it could maximize its influence by standing up to the United States and the United Kingdom trying to do so by standing alongside it. But there were also discontinuities. Serfaty is as unsparing in his criticism of Germany's unilateralism -- a sharp break with German tradition -- as he is in his criticism of the Bush administration. Less a narrative about the Iraq diplomacy than an essay about the strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic, Architects of Delusion is marked by the author's palpable regret that neither European nor U.S. leaders put the premium on transatlantic (and intra-European) solidarity, which he believes is both necessary and possible. Serfaty rejects the popular thesis that Europe and the United States are inevitably growing apart, but the sad tale he tells in this book will leave readers wondering whether the transatlantic alliance that existed before the Iraq war can really be restored.
Related
In "Saving NATO From Europe," (November/December 2004), Jeffrey L. Cimbalo warns that a dagger is pointed at the heart of the Atlantic alliance, and the murder weapon is the European Union's draft constitution. Ratification of that document, Cimbalo asserts, would have "profound and troubling implications for the transatlantic alliance and for future U.S. influence in Europe." Washington, he believes, should "end its uncritical support for European integration" and work with its friends in Europe to halt the EU process and save NATO from an untimely death.
In recent months, many observers have concluded that the United States and Europe are on divergent paths and that the transatlantic alliance is crumbling. In spite of some real differences, however, American and European attitudes remain remarkably similar on most key issues. Basing policy on the false assumption of transatlantic divorce would only make it a self-fulfilling prophecy.
President Charles de Gaulle in discussing current Franco-American relations often focuses upon the prewar neutrality of the United States as well as upon his wartime differences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In doing so he conjures up the image of an unreliable American ally. His recollections have also pushed into the background of public memory the two years before France's tragic collapse in June 1940, when, in the words of former Premier Edouard Daladier, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend." As Premier during those years, Daladier witnessed at first hand the American President's efforts to help France order some 4,000 American combat planes to rebuild French defenses against the imminent attack of Hitler's vastly superior air power. Hitherto the details of the story have been wrapped in the secrecy of American and French archives, private papers and personal memories, but it can now be seen that Roosevelt concentrated his principal effort on that aid because he believed that in no other way could the United States strengthen France so significantly. Neither Morgenthau's monetary agreements nor the sale of machine tools and raw materials would do so much to increase French capacity to resist Nazi aggression. Roosevelt was ready to go as far as possible in spite of isolationist opposition to the delivery of planes to France because of his further conviction that, despite the Neutrality Act, the frontiers of the United States extended to the Rhine.
