The real key to Washington’s pro-Israel policy is long-lasting and broad-based support for the Jewish state among the American public at large.
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author, most recently, of God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World.
Listen to this essay on CFR.org
On May 12, 1948, Clark Clifford, the White House chief counsel, presented the case for U.S. recognition of the state of Israel to the divided cabinet of President Harry Truman. While a glowering George Marshall, the secretary of state, and a skeptical Robert Lovett, Marshall's undersecretary, looked on, Clifford argued that recognizing the Jewish state would be an act of humanity that comported with traditional American values. To substantiate the Jewish territorial claim, Clifford quoted the Book of Deuteronomy: "Behold, I have set the land before you: go in and possess the land which the Lord sware unto your fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give unto them and to their seed after them."
Marshall was not convinced and told Truman that he would vote against him in the upcoming election if this was his policy. Eventually, Marshall agreed not to make his opposition public. Two days later, the United States granted the new Jewish state de facto recognition 11 minutes after Israel declared its existence as a state. Many observers, both foreign and domestic, attributed Truman's decision to the power of the Jewish community in the United States. They saw Jewish votes, media influence, and campaign contributions as crucial in the tight 1948 presidential contest.
Since then, this pattern has often been repeated. Respected U.S. foreign policy experts call for Washington to be cautious in the Middle East and warn presidents that too much support for Israel will carry serious international costs. When presidents overrule their expert advisers and take a pro-Israel position, observers attribute the move to the "Israel lobby" and credit (or blame) it for swaying the chief executive. But there is another factor to consider. As the Truman biographer David McCullough has written, Truman's support for the Jewish state was "wildly popular" throughout the United States. A Gallup poll in June 1948 showed that almost three times as many Americans "sympathized with the Jews" as "sympathized with the Arabs." That support was no flash in the pan. Widespread gentile support for Israel is one of the most potent political forces in U.S. foreign policy, and in the last 60 years, there has never been a Gallup poll showing more Americans sympathizing with the Arabs or the Palestinians than with the Israelis...
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Israel and Egypt's cold peace has turned arctic. Jerusalem and Cairo are clashing over nuclear disarmament, other Arab states' ties to Israel, the stability of the Mubarak regime, and the peace process. The strains stem from Israel's and Egypt's competing visions of a new Middle East, which they both hope to lead. With U.S.-Egyptian relations also on the rocks, these tensions threaten the entire Middle East peace process.
The USA should not make the same mistake with Syrian President Assad, that it made with Iraq's Saddam Hussain. "Assad now needs US favor more than the reverse. Yet he will try to induce Washington to pay him for allowing himself to be helped; this must not happen. US-Syrian relations can prosper only if American officials adhere to positions that are morally grounded and politically sound".
Reviews inter-state relations and foreign-policy initiatives in the Middle East in 1988, with special reference to US interests. Covers (1) Israel-PLO-US negotiations (2) the Iran-Iraq war and the UN peace plan (3) the US experience in Lebanon and the Gulf (4) arms purchases and the escalation of the regional arms race (5) future US interests and US-Soviet collaborative efforts in the region.
