Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
It would be best not to have to rely on a nuclear taboo to restrain North Korea, and so attempts to prevent its acquisition of nuclear weapons have been a high priority for both the Clinton and the George W. Bush administrations. As Pyongyang is now suspected to have a small nuclear arsenal, it is clear that these efforts have failed, although there has been more success in limiting the potential size of the arsenal by getting the Yongbyon reactor shut down. Chinoy has produced what will undoubtedly be the definitive account of the tortuous negotiations that produced this result. It benefits from excellent sources in both Koreas and in the United States and relates every twist and turn (there have been many) in the talks. North Korea was a founding member of Bush's "axis of evil," and the president spoke of his deep dislike for North Korea's supreme leader, Kim Jong Il. Accordingly, this story provides another example of the Bush administration's reluctance to engage with authoritarian and bankrupt regimes, lest they be granted an undeserved legitimacy or lest the administration find itself appeasing such regimes -- until the persistence of these regimes leaves the administration with little choice but to engage with them.
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Going Critical offers an insiders' view of the deal struck with North Korea in 1994 and a core lesson for the Bush administration: there's no substitute for negotiation.
New Zealand's decision to exclude nuclear weapons from its territory, and the American response to that decision, have raised serious questions about the character and management of the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) alliance and the security of the South Pacific.
Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarm ament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?
