Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion
There seem to be two basic views among students of U.S. foreign policy today. One school sees a distinct break between an early American tradition of reticence and modesty on the international stage and a later and more problematic era of assertiveness and expansionism. The year 1898 is often seen as dividing the two ages. In Habits of Empire, Nugent places himself squarely in the other school, that which sees continuity: he argues forcefully that important features of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy (expansionism, assertiveness, imperial ambition) were deeply rooted in American history dating back to the colonial era. He grounds his argument in a rich, detailed, and thoroughly researched discussion of U.S. diplomatic history focused on key moments in the country's growth. His account of the cultural and political context for this continuing expansion are not quite as strong; the book's greatest fault is that, with the exception of an unusually strong and balanced description of Mexican politics at the time of the Mexican-American War and, to a lesser extent, its description of British politics at the close of the American Revolution, the book rarely gives the targets of U.S. expansionism the thorough treatment it gives the Americans. This failure, particularly apparent in the accounts of the fall of the Hawaiian monarchy and the Spanish-American War, too often means that the reader does not have enough of a grasp of the opportunities and constraints facing U.S. policymakers to fully understand the choices they made.
Related
In American Vertigo, Bernard-Henri Lévy updates Tocqueville and defends the United States against anti-Americanism, while in Überpower, Josef Joffe counsels Washington on how to maintain its primacy.
The difference between the factions in Bosnia is not morality, as the Bosnian Muslims and Western press insist, but power and opportunity. All have the same goal: to avoid living as a minority. All have committed crimes against other ethnic groups. Despite its claims of neutrality and preaching against military solutions, the United States has favored the Bosnian Muslims, keeping silent as they launched offensives from U.N.-guarded safe areas. Since air strikes cannot resolve the conflict, the United States must discourage violence by all sides and let Russia--the one country Serbs trust--take the lead in negotiations.
The Cold War culture of military restraint has given way to increasing atrocities. By remaining a passive witness in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, and Chechnya, the United States damages its moral economy. Yet none of these conflicts sufficiently threatens U.S. interests to rouse the nation to arms. The United States should therefore return to the calculating siege craft common before Napoleon, which stressed minimal casualties, partial results, and patience. Every war need not be a heroic national crusade.
