To Lead the World: After the Bush Doctrine
With a distinguished cast of contributors, the editors Leffler and Legro have put together an unusually interesting and useful collection of essays on possible directions for U.S. foreign policy under a new administration. There is at least the beginning of a consensus among the experts: virtually all of them agree that the Bush administration's blunders have damaged the United States' stature and power abroad but that the damage can still be repaired. This consensus would be more useful if the experts did not disagree so fundamentally on what ought to be done next. Still, with their book's contributors comprising Stephen Van Evera, Robert Kagan, Charles Maier, G. John Ikenberry, James Kurth, Samantha Power, David Kennedy, Barry Eichengreen, Douglas Irwin, Francis Fukuyama, and Niall Ferguson, the editors have assembled some of today's most important and cogent thinkers on U.S. foreign policy. A final essay by Leffler and Legro highlights both the similarities of argument and the key points of contention among the contributors and succeeds in describing some of the key choices the next president must make.
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Pacific powers would like Korea to reunify slowly, but the North is soon likely to implode, its economy deteriorating as its weapons of mass destruction accumulate. Rapid reunification would spur economic growth, as in Germany, and reduce regional tensions. South Korea's liberalization of its own economy and strengthening of its civic institutions will prepare it to assist the North. China and Russia may not go along, but Western governments should stop coddling Pyongyang. America should underwrite a united Korea's security, and Japan its finances.
There is no "China threat," not because China is a benign giant but because it is too weak to challenge the balance of power. China can damage U.S. interests, but it does not require containment. The most striking aspect of Chinese foreign policy is its effort to promote stability. Indeed, China is easier to deal with today than ever before. The United States needs a policy to contend with China's ability to destabilize Asia, not a policy to deal with a future hegemon. China is a revisionist power, but for the foreseeable future it will seek to maintain the status quo-and so should the United States.
