To Lead the World: After the Bush Doctrine
With a distinguished cast of contributors, the editors Leffler and Legro have put together an unusually interesting and useful collection of essays on possible directions for U.S. foreign policy under a new administration. There is at least the beginning of a consensus among the experts: virtually all of them agree that the Bush administration's blunders have damaged the United States' stature and power abroad but that the damage can still be repaired. This consensus would be more useful if the experts did not disagree so fundamentally on what ought to be done next. Still, with their book's contributors comprising Stephen Van Evera, Robert Kagan, Charles Maier, G. John Ikenberry, James Kurth, Samantha Power, David Kennedy, Barry Eichengreen, Douglas Irwin, Francis Fukuyama, and Niall Ferguson, the editors have assembled some of today's most important and cogent thinkers on U.S. foreign policy. A final essay by Leffler and Legro highlights both the similarities of argument and the key points of contention among the contributors and succeeds in describing some of the key choices the next president must make.
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Somehow the United States has remained unchallenged despite victory. Defying the laws of realpolitik, no one is ganging up on the hegemon. Through two world wars, the United States practiced a strategy like Britain's, remaining aloof from international troubles, stepping in only to rectify the balance of power. Today the United States is more like Bismarck's Germany, developing alliances with everyone so that ganging up against it is impossible. But it will have to keep providing order and security for others. Only by doing good can it do well.
Russia's interests demand good relations with everyone, but older, darker forces tempt it to avenge its fall from superpowerdom. Westernizing democrats govern for now, but ex-communist elites and embittered generals scheme to re invigorate the military and reassert control over the borderlands. Their machinations are creating a fault line across the oil-rich Caucasus and Central Asia. For Russia to neglect its reconstruction to pursue the illusion of power would be a monumental mistake. While the expansion of NATO is misconceived, the West must not encourage Russian hard-liners with unmerited concessions.
With exclusive access to newly opened Soviet records, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali reveal that Kennedy blinked too soon and Khrushchev declared victory.

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