Russian Civil-Military Relations: Putin's Legacy
Normally, the study of civil-military relations seems to address a narrow, technical question of institutionalizing greater or lesser civilian control over the uniformed military, on which a long and distinguished literature exists, particularly in regard to the Soviet era. Gomart breaks away from this theme and attacks a problem at the core of Russia's contemporary political development and foreign policy: How do traditions (including a millennial history of militarism), a volatile domestic and foreign political context, and a political leadership's primal desire to restore Russia's greatness come together to shape the complex relationship between an outsized presidency and the country's composite of security institutions -- military, security, and police? His answer advances along three tracks: first, the Russian model in these respects does not and will not conform to comfortable Western models; second, the symbiosis of the political leadership with the security establishment has been key to promoting former President Vladimir Putin's power and agenda, but not in ways that allow him to own that establishment; and, third, the makeup of and dynamics among the different components are far more muddled and tension-ridden than cliché has it. A piece of advice: because the writing is in places obscure, the reader should begin with the conclusion, which makes everything clearer.
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Gorbachev's new thinking is based on the belief that military power is not the only way to national security, and that there is a link between national and mutual security. The revolution in foreign policy thinking has been most profound at the level of policy concepts, and has been based on a realization that the real threat to the USSR comes from the weakening of the economy due to excessive military spending. Notes how the ideas underpinning the foreign policy revolution have existed for the last decade, and how the evidence suggests that the change is genuine.
Russia's interests demand good relations with everyone, but older, darker forces tempt it to avenge its fall from superpowerdom. Westernizing democrats govern for now, but ex-communist elites and embittered generals scheme to re invigorate the military and reassert control over the borderlands. Their machinations are creating a fault line across the oil-rich Caucasus and Central Asia. For Russia to neglect its reconstruction to pursue the illusion of power would be a monumental mistake. While the expansion of NATO is misconceived, the West must not encourage Russian hard-liners with unmerited concessions.
Russia's post-Soviet orientation is in serious trouble. The West does not want to see any structure in Eurasia that permits Russian hegemony, but abetting continued chaos in the former Soviet space is hardly in the West's interest. Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite and draw in outside powers, and the presence of nuclear weapons raises the stakes even higher. The United States should support integration, not division. For its part, Russia should work with nearby countries to help unite diverse peoples in a stabler system.

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