Rice's Record
The Secretary of State reflects on the lessons of the past eight years.
To the Editor:
Condoleezza Rice's "Rethinking the National Interest" (July/August 2008) presented the secretary of state with a unique opportunity to use the forum of this magazine productively. Unfortunately, the fundamental policies of the Bush administration have not changed, and her article was nothing more than a restatement of previous failed policies. Such pronouncements in the twilight of her tenure are nothing more than rhetorical justifications for the failed ideologies, poor judgments, and gross misuse of power that have characterized the Bush administration's foreign policy.
Rather than refute her claims of success one by one, it is enough to repeat what is publicly known and a matter of record. The Iraq war was not a war of necessity. Its initial stages were characterized by poor planning, the selective use of intelligence, and insufficient combat and occupation resources. For three and a half years following the invasion, George W. Bush, Rice, and other key policymakers in the administration were in a state of denial, and Iraq degenerated into open civil war. Five years, 4,100 American military deaths, and $700 billion later, the debacle continues.
Secretary Rice's vision, view of history, and accounting of the foreign policy status quo are fictional at best. In January 2009, she will leave office. The rest of us will be left to deal with our relatives who have experienced the war firsthand, pay for the war with our taxes, and strive to develop a nonideological foreign policy that reflects the United States' form of government and the practical limits of its power.
Steven L. Hull
Captain (Retired), U.S. Navy
Related
Although terrorism is a top U.S. concern, the State Department's annual terrorism report was riddled with errors. If Washington wants to win the war, it needs to get its facts straight.
The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has prompted much handwringing over the problems with prewar intelligence. Too little attention has been paid, however, to the flip slide of the picture: that the much-maligned UN-enforced sanctions regime actually worked. Contrary to what critics have said, we now know that containment helped destroy Saddam Hussein's war machine and his capacity to produce weapons.
Over the past six years, Congress' oversight of the executive branch on foreign and national security policy has virtually collapsed. Compounding the problem, the Bush administration has aggressively asserted executive prerogatives -- sometimes with dire consequences. The oversight problem must be fixed, ideally as part of a more fundamental effort to restore the balance between the two branches.
