Unclear Nuclear Logic?

Daalder and Lodal are wrong when they argue that the United States' land-based missiles are vulnerable to attack. The world they are talking about -- the height of the Cold War -- is gone. As Larry Welch, former commander of the Strategic Air Command and former U.S. Air Force chief of staff, has explained, the end of the Cold War, along with the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties and the Moscow Treaty, have so reduced Russia's deployed nuclear forces that they no longer threaten the survival of the U.S. land-based missile force.

In order to attack the United States' 450 Minuteman missiles and their associated silos and launch-control facilities, an adversary would have to attack the United States with over 1,000 warheads. Such an attack is outside the capability of every nation of the world save Russia, and even it would be hard-pressed to undertake one once the Moscow Treaty is fully implemented. Such a hypothetical attack could not by its nature come out of the blue. Russian forces would have to be placed on very high alert, an action that U.S. satellites would immediately detect. In turn, this early detection would allow the United States to protect its nuclear forces, making them impossible to attack simultaneously in a first strike. The synergy between intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles is what gives deterrence its strength and viability, a foundation Daalder and Lodal would destroy.

The ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, the most survivable and stabilizing one, is a critical and viable element of the United States' deterrent. The American people have recently supported a nearly unanimous consensus in Congress to complete the refurbishment of these land-based missiles that has been undertaken over the past two decades, a job that is nearly complete.
Should the United States make the wrong-headed decision to eliminate its land-based missiles, its adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, will thank the United States for its thoughtlessness and continue their nuclear programs. It would be radically less difficult for nuclear-armed adversaries, present and future, to strike the United States first and eliminate its capability to deter. There is no evidence whatsoever that China or Russia would stand down a single one of its nuclear-armed rockets should the United States follow the advice of Daalder and Lodal. In fact, such an action might very well encourage the growth of other nuclear forces, as nations see an opportunity to become a peer competitor with the United States.

PETER HUESSY
Senior Defense Consultant, National Defense University Foundation, and President, GeoStrategic Analysis