Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?

If popular unrest is not a true threat to the party's continued rule, then what is? The answer could likely be disunity among the country's elite. Those who talk of China's "authoritarian resilience" consider elite unity to be one of the CCP's most significant achievements in recent decades, citing as evidence technocratic dominance, a lack of ideological disputes, the creation of standardized procedures for the promotion and retirement of high officials, and the relatively smooth leadership succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.

But there are reasons to remain skeptical of such apparent harmony -- arrangements of power that are struck in times of economic prosperity often come undone when crisis hits.

The current Chinese leadership is a delicately balanced coalition of regional, factional, and institutional interests, which makes it vulnerable to dissension. To most Western eyes, China is blessed with strong, capable, and decisive leaders. But to the Chinese leaders themselves, the situation looks somewhat different. Their resumés are remarkably similar, as are their records as administrators. No single individual towers above the others in terms of demonstrated leadership, vision, or performance -- which means that no one is beyond challenge, and the stage is set for jockeying for preeminence.

So far, the real glue that has held the CCP together is a vast patronage system that has been underwritten by a long period of economic growth. The regime has used its financial resources to balance domestic interests, satisfy different constituencies, and purchase the contingent support of China's social elites. But this patronage system is extremely expensive -- administrative expenses alone consume more than 20 percent of China's government budget, and over 40 percent of China's GDP comes from fixed-asset investments such as factories and warehouses -- a sector that is state-dominated and stuffed with pork. In other words, China's nonideological ruling elites have stuck with the party because it has been paying them off. But when economic hardship ends the easy handouts, the elites' support and loyalty to the system can no longer be taken for granted.

Rising social discontent may not be enough to force the party out of power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage. Such political entrepreneurs could use populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open up divisions within the party's seemingly unified upper ranks.

Any of these sources of elite dissension could lead to confusion and turmoil within the Chinese state's repressive apparatus, rendering it less capable of containing social instability and thus creating a vicious cycle of events that could result in progressive destabilization.

Does this mean the CCP's rule is doomed? Not yet. The government has weathered the early stages of the crisis successfully, and even tensions within its upper ranks might yield something less than regime change. But as the economic slowdown continues, some political impact in China is likely -- and any change is apt to come from the top rather than the bottom.