Home › Features › Snapshots › Pyongbang!

Pyongbang!

Washington’s Korea Conundrum
Victor D. Cha
April 7, 2009
Article Summary

What North Korea hoped to gain from its failed missile launch -- and how Washington can avoid falling into its negotiating trap.

VICTOR D. CHA is Associate Professor, Director of Asian Studies, and D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair in Asian Studies and Government at Georgetown University. From 2004 to 2007, he served as Director of Asian Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council and Deputy Head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks.

Essay
Korea's Place in the Axis
Victor D. Cha

President Bush's condemnation of North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" caused confusion worldwide, as allies and enemies alike tried to discern his administration's constantly shifting policy toward Pyongyang. But there is method to the madness. Look closely, and a consistent strategy emerges: "hawk engagement." Although Bush's team may use tactics seemingly similar to those of Clinton's, the administration wants to engage Kim Jong Il for very different reasons: to set him up for a fall.

 Read
Postscript
Postscript: Korea's Place in the Axis
Victor D. Cha
Read
“

This launch was a clear effort to show that the military is in charge, that the DPRK 'can't be pushed around,' and that the North has 'good quality missile technology for sale.'

”
Pempel comments on
"Pyongbang!"
3 Comments Join

Fourth, the United States and other countries should offer to educate and feed every North Korean child and dramatically increase humanitarian assistance to the North Korean people in general, including food, medicine, education, and energy. (Some of this could even be tied to stimulus package efforts to employ U.S. workers from Michigan and elsewhere on winterization and house-building projects in North Korea.) 

All these measures can and should supplement the existing six-party diplomacy.  Sustaining the six-party talks is critical for continuing the disablement and degradation of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. But U.S. strategy needs to acknowledge that there will never be a true end to the North's nuclear ambitions so long as Kim and his immediate circle remain in power. While negotiating today, therefore, the United States needs to prepare for the real opportunities for engagement that may lie down the road.

Related

Essay, Nov/Dec 2009
Changing North Korea
Andrei Lankov

By exposing them to the truth about their impoverishment and about the prosperity of their South Korean cousins, the United States can encourage North Koreans to change the regime in Pyongyang.

Read
Essay, Jan/Feb 2005
Did North Korea Cheat?
Selig S. Harrison

Two years ago, Washington accused Pyongyang of running a secret nuclear weapons program. But how much evidence was there to back up the charge? A review of the facts shows that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the data--while ignoring the one real threat North Korea actually poses.

Read
Essay, Mar/Apr 2003
How to Deal With North Korea
James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen

Pyongyang's belligerent behavior should not obscure other dramatic conciliatory steps North Korea has taken in recent years--steps suggesting that, even now, a solution lies within reach. The trick is to craft a plan that does not reward the North for its misdeeds. In such a plan, all major outside powers should guarantee the security of the entire Korean Peninsula first. This will remove Pyongyang's excuse for nuclear proliferation--and break the deadlock on the world's last Cold War frontier.

Read
Cover image

In the Magazine

November/December 2009, 6, 88
Essay
The Dollar and the Deficits
C. Fred Bergsten

The global economic crisis has revealed the folly of large U.S. budget and trade deficits, as well as of the strong dollar that makes them possible. If it is serious about recovery, the United States must balance the budget, stimulate private saving, and embrace a declining dollar.
Read