Overblown

The most worrisome concern regarding an Iranian nuclear capability is that nuclear weapons would give it a free hand to pursue its regional ambitions, whether taking a more dominant role in Iraq's internal politics or increasing material and logistical support to groups such as Hezbollah. But a nuclear weapon would not change Iran's basic calculation of what it can pull off without incurring an unacceptable response. A crude nuclear capability would not necessarily preclude either the United States or Israel from responding to an Iranian act of aggression -- and Iran would have the most to lose from an escalating crisis.

In fact, once Iran is known to have the bomb, it would become imperative for the regime to avoid actions that could lead to escalation. If anything, Iran might find that possession of a nuclear weapon actually diminishes its options in the Middle East and forces it to act with greater restraint. Actions against superior powers that in the past might have been viewed as simple irritants -- such as assenting to Katyusha launches against Israel and providing rudimentary explosives to groups challenging U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan -- suddenly would seem, even with a limited nuclear capability, far more ominous and almost invite an overwhelming response.

This, then, begs the question: If Iran does not plan on using a nuclear weapon, if the regime would never give a bomb to a terrorist group, and if a nuclear capability would not provide Iran cover to pursue its interests more aggressively, why are the mullahs challenging the West and enduring sanctions in order to acquire one?

Iran might feel that a nuclear weapon, with all of its inherent risk, would at least rule out any serious talk of regime change. Certain hard-line elements within Iran may view a small weapons capability necessary to prevent Washington from considering any operation designed to topple the regime. That said, it is not entirely clear that the regime is seeking an actual weapon. Enriching uranium to fuel nuclear power plants that do not yet exist might not make sense economically or otherwise, but that has never stopped seemingly rational countries from making similar decisions in the past. Moreover, Iran might be content to stop short of producing an actual weapon and settle for a latent capability. The regime may believe the ability to produce fissile material alone is enough of a deterrent, making the pain and cost of producing an actual bomb unnecessary. As noted above, U.S. policymakers have shown no hesitation in giving the impression that a nuclear Iran would change the region irrevocably. It is certainly not lost on Iran that Washington talks as if it already has been deterred by a country that has done nothing more than enrich a small amount of uranium and launch missiles that could hit the United States only after catching a 4,000-mile-per-hour tailwind.

This is not to say that a nuclear-armed Iran poses no threat to the region or to the world. Deterrence at first glance worked well in the last century, but Tehran could miscalculate and take action that invites preemption, causing devastation to its population. Groups with disparate agendas in Iran could succeed in providing nuclear technology to a terrorist group for financial or ideological reasons; Iran, like every other state in the world, is far from unitary. In this sense, the international community should oppose Iran going nuclear as much as it should any other country doing so.

But the tenor of today's debate has lost all sense of proportion. A nuclear-armed Iran would increase risk, but ironically it is Iranian civilians and the Islamic Republic's own leaders who would bear the brunt of it.