Lions and Jackals

Although this emerging strategy is a welcome change from the past, it is anything but complete. Without continued support from Central Command and the Pakistani people, who will be watching the fate of the three million refugees who fled Swat, this offshoot of the Bajaur Experiment will fail. Successful tactics championed by individual officers lack consistency and can go only so far. A sweeping doctrinal shift in intelligence collection and civil-military coordination is needed to institutionalize the Bajaur Experiment's innovations. What's more, the military lacks many of the material resources necessary to sustain this type of counterinsurgency and will need international support.

The United States is in a key position to help. Pakistani military officers often note the need for helicopters, gunships, and armored vehicles. One major general explained: "We have 12 operational helicopters [four more were recently added]. One hour of flying requires three hours of maintenance." He continued, observing that the "U.S. Army is flying more than 100 in Afghanistan." But Pentagon officials have been reluctant to provide the army with machinery, pointing to past financial foul play and Pakistan's long history of tolerating -- and, worse, abetting -- Taliban attacks on U.S. troops.

However, the military's emerging counterinsurgency model, which places the Taliban at the top of Pakistan's threat assessment, should shift U.S. perceptions. Additionally, it will be in the United States' interest to capitalize on Pakistan's new model as it braces for Afghan elections and a major U.S. troop surge there this winter. It is likely that turmoil after the election and increased U.S. presence in Afghanistan will push the Taliban east into Pakistan. Only with long-term U.S. support will Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategy be able to stabilize the region.

The United States can start by helping to fill gaps in training, research, and equipment. The U.S. military should continue to lead training programs and should help Pakistan build a Fort Leavenworth-type military research and lessons-learned institution to expand the Bajaur Experiment. A joint U.S.-Pakistani process should be developed to share best practices across the Afghan-Pakistani border. U.S. aid should be balanced between training and equipment; to fight this kind of counterinsurgency, the Pakistani military most needs helicopter gunships and armored vehicles.

Finally, the United States should aid Islamabad in providing relief to the three million Swat refugees and developing a robust strategic communications campaign. These efforts will ensure continued public support, which will sustain the Bajaur Experiment's improvements to the military's strategy and culture. A retired Pakistani general who commanded troops in an earlier operation summarized the new Pakistani military this way: "They were soldiers fighting their people. Now they are lions fighting jackals." The lions remain Pakistan's one hope for victory.