Know Thine Enemy

Why the Taliban Cannot Be Flipped
Summary -- 

Beyond the current debate about U.S. strategy in Afghanistan lie more fundamental questions of who the Taliban are, how they are organized, what they want, and whether they can be separated from al Qaeda.

BARBARA ELIAS is Director of the Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Taliban Project at the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

General Stanley McChrystal’s proposal for substantial U.S. troop increases in Afghanistan has triggered a major debate about U.S. policy toward the conflict there, both within the Obama administration and without. Behind the dispute over American resources, strategy, and interests, however, lie fundamental questions that rarely get addressed directly: Who is the enemy in Afghanistan, and what do they want? Al Qaeda, die-hard terrorists who seek to continue what they started, is one obvious answer. Fine. But what about the Taliban? Are they so closely linked to al Qaeda as to be indistinguishable from them, or can they be dealt with -- either co-opted or allowed to thrive untouched?

Commentators often distinguish between Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban, but, in terms of ethnicity and location, they are very similar -- both are Pashtun and both enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The main difference is in their leadership structures. In the early 1990s, Mullah Muhammad Omar, the current Afghan Taliban leader, united a group of fellow anti-Soviet mujahideen to combat the chaos that the country had fallen into after the Soviets’ departure. They coined a name for themselves by combining the Arabic prefix “Talib” (meaning “student”) with the Pashto plural suffix “-an” -- seeking to convey their humility and background in Pakistan’s Islamist madrassas. Mullah Omar’s group was able to grow rapidly and take over the country largely because other contenders for power had become so brutal, fragmented, and unattractive to average Afghans. The population did not demand a severe Islamist regime but was willing to accept one as a way to restore order.

The Taliban who governed Afghanistan from 1996–2001 had strong ties to Pakistan, both official and unofficial: they formed their identity in Pakistani schools and refugee camps, received funding and support from Islamabad that enabled their rise, and had close bilateral relations with their patrons after they seized power. Their agenda, however, was primarily a national one, and it remained so even after they were toppled and driven into the wilderness by the United States in 2001–2. Taliban spokesmen claim Mullah Omar has no involvement in militant activities in Pakistan, and that his main goal is to expel American and allied forces from Afghanistan and to reestablish a national Islamic regime. He and his forces aim to outwit, outlast, and outplay yet another alien superpower, replicating the mujahideen’s victory against the Soviets.

The Pakistani Taliban, on the other hand, are largely operationally independent of Mullah Omar and less structured and unified than their Afghan counterparts. Divided among various fiefdoms throughout Pakistan’s restive tribal regions, in recent years they have been loosely connected under umbrella organizations such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud, TTP’s commander, was killed by a U.S. Predator strike on August 5, but just how much of an impact his death will have on the effectiveness of the Pakistani Taliban is unclear. Mehsud himself rose to prominence after a Predator strike killed South Waziristan’s rising Taliban commander, Nek Mohammed, in 2004, and Mehsud has already been replaced by a deputy, Hakimullah Mehsud (no relation). The targeted killing is thus likely to undermine the Pakistani Taliban’s recent tentative cohesion, but no individual leader is as important to this movement as Mullah Omar is to the Afghan one.

The Pakistani Taliban’s strategic decision to challenge Islamabad directly has significant consequences for the fighting in Afghanistan, because it could finally convince Islamabad to help, rather than undermine, Washington’s efforts.

The public mission statements of the Pakistani Taliban emphasize the group’s dedication to helping expel foreign troops from Afghanistan. Since their emergence in 2002, however, the Pakistani Taliban have been increasingly active locally, implementing sharia law, consolidating power in Pakistan’s tribal regions, and challenging the writ of both traditional tribal authority and Islamabad. They clearly seek to govern parts of Pakistan permanently -- but just how much remains unknown. The TTP expanded its activities outside the tribal regions to the Swat and Buner districts in April 2009, provoking a major counteroffensive by a seemingly embarrassed Pakistani army.

Also unknown is the precise relationship between Mullah Omar and the Pakistani Taliban. The latter’s mission statements proclaim loyalty to Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, and Mullah Omar’s movement relies on Pakistan’s tribal areas for safe haven and support of all kinds. Yet Mullah Omar reportedly attempted to oust Mehsud in January 2008 for fighting the Pakistani army instead of the United States. (Either reports of this incident were false or Mullah Omar failed; Mehsud did not budge.) Certainly the Pakistani Taliban’s strategic decision to challenge Islamabad directly has significant consequences for the fighting in Afghanistan, because it could finally convince Islamabad to help, rather than undermine, Washington’s efforts. (In the past, Pakistan has supported the Afghan Taliban as a tool and an ally in its endless strategic game with India, but now the country may be paying the price. If the Pakistani Taliban remain united and continue to attack within Pakistan, Islamabad will be forced to reconsider its policies.) At the moment, however, it seems that even if Islamabad has the will to conquer the Taliban, the Pakistani army may lack the desire and capacity.