If the Obama administration has any hope of reducing the world’s nuclear arsenals, the U.S. government will have to assuage the fears of nonnuclear states, diminish the prestige of nuclear weapons, and address the risk of proliferation posed by civilian nuclear energy programs.
CHARLES D. FERGUSON is President of the Federation of American Scientists. From 2004 to 2009, he was Senior Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he served as Project Director for the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.
An annotated Foreign Affairs syllabus on nuclear proliferation.
Over the past three years, a remarkable bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington regarding nuclear security. The new U.S. nuclear agenda includes renewing formal arms control agreements with Russia, revitalizing a strategic dialogue with China, pushing for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, repairing the damaged nuclear nonproliferation regime, and redoubling efforts to reduce and secure fissile material that may be used in weapons. During the 2008 presidential campaign, the veteran foreign policy experts Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George Shultz successfully encouraged both major-party candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, to embrace the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons. In the past year, President Obama has made this goal a priority for his administration, although he admits that it is not likely to occur in his lifetime.
This presents a conundrum, however: In a world where the strongest conventional military power cannot envision giving up its nuclear weapons before all other nations have abandoned theirs, how will humanity ever rid itself of these weapons? In order to speed the reduction of its own nuclear arsenal and encourage other countries' disarmament, the United States will have to confront three daunting obstacles: the insecurities of nations, including some currently protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and others that see a nuclear capability as the answer to many of their security problems; the notion that nuclear weapons are the great equalizer in the realm of international relations; and the proliferation risk that inevitably arises whenever nuclear supplier states offer to build civilian reactors for nonnuclear states.
STOPPING THE CASCADE
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