With the Lisbon Treaty now in effect, the European Union has more power to implement foreign policy decisions -- on paper, at least. The reformed EU's effectiveness will ultimately depend on whether its member states focus on continued integration rather than on retaining their national perspectives.
ANTHONY LUZZATTO GARDNER, Managing Director at Palamon Capital Partners, served as Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council staff from 1994 to 1995. STUART E. EIZENSTAT is Head of the International Practice at Covington & Burling LLP. He served in the Clinton administration as U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Undersecretary of Commerce, Undersecretary of State, and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, and he was Domestic Policy Adviser to President Jimmy Carter.
An annotated Foreign Affairs syllabus on the European Union.
On December 1, 2009, after nearly a decade of acrimonious debate, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force across the 27 member states of the European Union. The treaty reforms EU institutions, making the organization more accountable to voters and enhancing its ability to address European and global challenges. Over the long term, the treaty may make the EU a more coherent international actor, thereby significantly affecting non-EU countries, including the United States.
The Lisbon Treaty is the latest in a long line of EU reform efforts. It is the fifth amendment to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community, the EU's predecessor. Following the Single European Act of 1986 -- which laid the foundations for Europe's single market, assuring for the first time the free flow of goods, capital, people, and services among the member states -- the EU reformed its institutions and decision-making process through the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, and the Nice Treaty of 2001. But with the cumulative effect of these amendments widely acknowledged to have complicated decision-making -- and with the organization planning to enlarge from 15 to 25 member states in 2004 -- EU leaders sought to replace the confusing patchwork of EU treaties with a single, overarching constitution. The resulting document, drafted by a constitutional convention in 2002-3, was signed by all EU heads of government in 2004 but was rejected the following year by French and Dutch voters, who feared that a European constitution would limit their countries' national voting rights, sovereignty, and access to EU funds.
In 2007, after a two-year "period of reflection," the EU heads of state agreed in Lisbon on a draft treaty that was nearly identical in substance to the constitution but -- in deference to public opinion in some member states -- dropped references to the trappings of statehood (such as an EU flag and an EU anthem) and sought to amend, rather than replace, earlier EU treaties. By November 2009, every EU member state had ratified the treaty.
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Markets are reeling because Europe's leaders have only offered up half-measures to resolve the crisis. Not until Brussels, Paris, and Berlin realize the fundamental flaw in their current approach -- a lack of real political and economic integration across the eurozone -- will there be an end in sight.
Most pundits argue the eurozone has only two options: break up or create a fiscal union to match its monetary one. In fact, there's a third, and better, path: adopt tighter market discipline, bailing out illiquid countries while letting truly insolvent ones go bust. The result would be a collection of fitter economies and a Europe strong enough to play a big role on the world stage.
As the European debt crisis grows more unwieldy by the day, the ECB may be the only entity with enough financial firepower -- the ability to bail out debt-ridden countries -- to reassure global markets. Critics argue the Bank should have stepped in as a lender of last resort long ago. Now the pressure is on Draghi to take risks his predecessor refused.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.