The economic crisis did not alter the deep structural changes already in global energy markets -- rising energy demand in the developing world and growing concerns about carbon emissions -- and it revealed how the oil, coal, and natural gas markets could help address the major energy challenges ahead.
CHRISTOF RÜHL is Chief Economist of BP plc.
Commercially traded energy is what classical economists used to call a "basic good": directly or indirectly, it enters the production of every other produced commodity or service. Nonrenewable fossil-fuel energy and nuclear energy are produced by first converting and then burning natural resources. Because these resources are finite and unevenly distributed, they seem to become increasingly hard to come by when global economic activity expands. The need to maintain regular access to them is the simple logic behind the concept of energy security. Recently, these traditional concerns have been exacerbated by another threat: the fear that the atmosphere's capacity to absorb carbon emissions caused by humans may be exhausted long before humans' capacity to find hydrocarbons in the earth's crust and burn them for energy is.
In many places, the main means of addressing these concerns has been to rely on markets, which make it easier to diversify supply and demand, substitute fuels, and make the most of the gains in efficiency brought on by technological change. More recently, the idea of putting a price on carbon has extended this approach to protecting the environment.
But now global energy consumers are losing trust in these pricing mechanisms. In the five years prior to the summer of 2008, oil prices rose by 370 percent, traded coal by 460 percent, and natural gas by 120 percent. The prices of other raw materials, metals, and even food increased in lockstep. The only other time since World War II that prices rose that much was in the early 1970s. Back then, as recently, prices were driven by a surge in global economic growth.
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For the last five years the world has been trying to cope with a set of problems triggered by the sudden oil price explosion of late 1973: the availability of oil to cover future energy demand, the economic and financial upheaval attending the jump in oil prices, and the utilization of a flood of petrodollars by OPEC countries for their national development and other purposes. These three issues are intimately interrelated and interact on each other; they can thus be properly assessed only in conjunction with each other.
The sustained and alarming depreciation of the U.S. dollar against some major European currencies and the Japanese yen during 1977 and the early part of 1978 has ushered in a new element of instability in the shaky international monetary system. One of the most critical effects of the dollar devaluation has been a new and unwelcome pressure on the real price of crude oil, which has been steadily shrinking since 1973 (despite the two 10-percent-upward adjustments in October 1975 and December 1976).
For about a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War, the market economies of the non-communist world enjoyed an unprecedented rate of growth, an exceptionally low level of unemployment, and comparatively low inflation. The average growth of the gross national product (GNP) in the advanced industrial nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from 1951 to 1973 was 4.8 percent a year in real terms. It was not until 1975 that output actually fell in the noncommunist world as a whole--and then by only one percent--whereas before the war there were periods when it fell very dramatically by from five to seven percent. Since 1975, growth has been averaging less than it did from 1951 to 1973--about 3.8 as against 4.8 percent--but there are ominous signs that it may settle down over the next decade to an average significantly lower than the current rate. Moreover, all the evidence is that, in the foreseeable future, the average growth of output in the free world is not going to recover to the level we experienced during those golden years from 1951 to 1973.

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